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THE NEED OF COURAGE.

By

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A brave man leaveth not the battle,  
He who flieth from it is no true warrior,  
In the field of this body a great war is toward  
Against Passion, Hunger, Pride and Greed,  
It is for the Kingdom of Truth, of Contentment and of  
Purity that this battle is raging:  
And the sword that ringeth most loudly is the sword  
Of His name.

—KABIR, Hindu Poet.

PHILOSOPHY, if it is ever mentioned by the ordinary "man in the street," is treated as something unpractical and out of relation to the business of life. Even by many citizens who have received a higher education it is dubbed "metaphysics," and ignored as if it were a useless study. It is not recognised that it is the highest study in which mankind can engage, and that it lies at the basis of all thought. It deals, as a Gifford lecturer has said, with "Affirmations about the Universe." And can there be a higher study? Have we not read much lately about "Relativity"? And do not the higher physics and the more recondite mathematics resolve themselves into a philosophical problem?

Philosophy is, however, a word that includes several branches of learning, such as Ontology, Logic, Psychology and Ethics. And on Ethics all our social problems must be based. A modern philosopher, Viscount Haldane, has said: "The foundation of purpose in the State, through all changes of party policy, must, if the national life is to grow permanently and not to diminish, to prosper and not to fade, be ethical."

The State, according to Aristotle, must be based on justice, and justice includes all virtues. What, it may be asked, is the virtue which in these days is most required? Is it not Courage? How stands the race to-day? In all the nations called civilized the problems of the origin, and the aim of life are being discussed. There is much pessimism abroad. In-

stead of thinking of a "far off divine event" to which the whole creation moves, we read many books on decadence and the end of life of all kinds, the earth becoming like her satellite, the moon, a barren world without life.

Professor J. S. Mackenzie, of London, has recently said:

"All that we can hope for in this present existence is to gain enough insight to enable us to realise that the riddle of the universe need not be supposed to be for ever insoluble. In the strength of that conviction—being persuaded that we are not absolutely marooned in the midst of chaos, forlorn intellects in an unintelligible environment—we may turn our attention to the great problem, especially in such times as the present, which most nearly concerns us—that of the betterment of human life, the gradual realisation of the ultimate values."

How then stands this question of courage? Many definitions have been given of the virtue. Generally it is associated with military or naval warfare. It cannot be said that the worship of war has been confined to one nation. For centuries there have been leaders of thought who have extolled war as the "School of Duty." Even the Philosopher Bacon upheld the same idea of the lawfulness of war that we can read in the works of many modern Germans, such as Treitschke and Bernhardt, Eberhard and others. In his "Advertisement Touching an Holy War," written in 1622, one of the interlocutors says:

"Some men, some nations, excel in the one ability, some in the other. Therefore, the position which I intend is not in the comparative, that the wiser, or the stouter or the juster nation should govern; but in the privative that where there is a heap of people—though we term it a kingdom or a State—that is altogether unable or indign to govern, there it is a just cause of war for another nation, that is civil or policed, to subdue them; and this though it were to be done by a Cyrus or a Caesar, that were no Christians."

He continues:

"When the constitution of the State, and the fundamental customs and laws of the same—if laws they may be called—are against the laws of nature and nations, then I say a war upon them is lawful." (See 1826 edition, vol. 3 p. 479 et seq.)

At the same time he did not venture to assert that war on similar states was just or lawful. It is only a nation like Turkey that could be invaded. Modern Germans made no such limitation. The military men amongst them were dominated with the idea of Frederick the Great that war was the

School for all virtues—steadfastness, courage, charity, etc. etc.

Bernhardi said:

"War and brave spirit have done more great things than love of your neighbours. Not your sympathies, but your stout-hearted prowess is what saves the unfortunate." (See Morley's Notes on "Politics and History," p. 103.)

Humanity in civilized nations has risen to a higher view of life than is shown in the works of many groups in Europe. It is erroneous to assume that courage is found only amongst nations that exalt war. As great courage has been displayed by civilians as by soldiers or sailors. In fact, it may be said that the weakness of the German nation has been its lack of courage, and this has been emphasised in a small book, published by the late Walther Rathenau, in 1920—"Die Neue Gesellschaft."

We may disagree with the proposed new Society he suggests, but he is competent to tell us the pre-war state of the German nation, and its condition after peace. He declared that the German nation had been left without convictions and had "no eye to the true boundaries of rights, claims and responsibilities," and he called on his people to "tread the path of suffering with a pride which disdains to be consoled by illusions." What was that but to be courageous? He had no doubt about the cause of war. He said:—

"The nation showed a brutal stupid community of interested persons, greedy for power, who gave themselves out as that Germany whose very opposite they were; who, unable to point to any achievements, any thought of their own, prided themselves on an imaginary race-unity which their very appearance contradicted; who had no ideas beyond rancour; the slaverings of League-oratory and subordination, and who with these properties, which they were pleased to call *Kultur*, undertook to bring blessing to the world."

What the Germans lacked is thus summed up:—

"The German people, from lack of self-consciousness, indolence of will and innate servility, remained under a patriarchal system of government, a minor under tutelage of divinely-appointed dynasties and ruling classes."

What is this but to say that the people lacked courage? And the injury that this has occasioned to the people may be seen in their brutality in the Great War. The depth of degradation to which that great nation fell can be found perhaps most succinctly stated in a small book by that eminent literary critic J. M. Robertson—"War and Civilization,"

The German people lacked "Courage." They allowed themselves to be enslaved, with the result that their war record is that of savages. The true test of courage, then, is not the action of a human being in war. The poet Lowell has shown who are not courageous:—

"They are slaves who fear to speak  
For the fallen and the weak.  
They are slaves who will not choose  
Hatred, scoffing and abuse  
Rather than in silence shrink  
From the truth they needs must think.  
They are slaves who dare not be  
In the right with two or three."

Mere action may not be courageous. We must surely require:

1. That the actor knows what he is doing: mere impulsiveness must be excluded.
2. That the actor realises his danger from acting.
3. That he acts without considering a reward, either here or hereafter.
4. There must be a feeling of duty.

The actor goes forward because he feels he ought to do so. We must not consider the kind of acts done. It may be an act at a shipwreck, or at a fire, or an altruistic act of help, or in a fight, or in performing any duty which may subject the actor to injury of any kind. A man may be courageous who has to stand alone in the struggle for what he believes to be right. In effect, courage is ever displayed when the actor is compelled in scorn of consequences to fulfil what he considers to be his duty. Unless the act is conscious, it is not virtuous, and cannot be called courageous. What do we need to-day more than courage? It has been pointed out that in nature there is continually going on a levelling process; mountains are being smoothed down and hills made plains. It is estimated, says a recent writer, "that the rivers of the United States convey 783,000,000 tons of material from the land to the ocean every year." And in human life there is ever a danger of individuality being weakened, if not destroyed. The customs of the race, the habits of the crowd, the group mind, or the popular feeling, as it is sometimes called, tend to lower the personality of mankind. It is not "good form" some say, to be in what is called a "miserable minority." Does a citizen dare to stand alone? He may do so without reason—that is, he may act not from a sense of duty, or his mental balance may not be strong. Hence it is said that to be courageous implies action after considera-

tion and thought by an intelligent and reasonable being. And such a being, if he finds himself standing alone, must carefully, using his reason as best he can, consider if he is right. If he finds that men of high aims and noble life disagree with him, he ought not readily to assume that he is right and that they are wrong. If, however, after much consideration he feels duty compelling him to take a certain line of action, then—subject to what must be said as to his duty as a citizen—he must follow whither his idea of duty leads. He has, however, to remember that he is one of many. He lives in society, and he has a duty to that society. Peace must reign in society, otherwise it is dissolved. He must obey the laws which he and others have made. If he finds that he cannot because of his conscience, duly enlightened, obey the laws of his State, he must either leave the State, or else his first duty will be to try to educate his fellows to take the same views of these laws of life as he does. No State can permit a citizen, however courageous, to engage in war and to repudiate the laws of the society under which he dwells. He can display courage in attempting to teach his fellows, or to lead his fellows in the way he thinks they should walk. It would not be virtuous to refuse to obey the mandates of the society in which he dwells.

Every race has shown us samples of courage. The history of religious conflicts gives us many such examples. The founding by emigrants of new nations has often exhibited rare courage. We know the story of the Mayflower, and the landing of the English pilgrims on the north-eastern shore of America. These men and women were fearless, and they obeyed what they believed to be their duty, and their example has ennobled the great nation they founded.

Civil revolutions which have ended in war have also shown us true courage in those who rose up against tyranny and injustice. We must, however, ever remember that war is only to be employed when all other efforts have failed. This is well put in a speech delivered by one of New Zealand's pioneers, statesman and courageous settler. He was opposing war with the Maoris, and in a famous speech made in the New Zealand Parliament in 1862 he said:—

"I know well that evil days may come when the sacred inheritance of light and truth which God has given to a nation to hold and to transmit may only be saved by an appeal to arms—the last ordeal of nations—the trial by war; but I know, too, how great the crime which rests in the souls of those who, for any less vital cause or for any less dire necessity, precipitate that fatal issue."

If the dire necessity for war arises, then he is courageous who goes to the assistance of the oppressed.

The warlike state in which mankind dwelt in the distant past has almost ceased to exist. For what then do we need courage nowadays? Mankind no longer lives in caves troubled with wild beasts and savage men. In most civilized communities there is peace—"law and order," as it is termed. Much misery there is in this world, and there is much pessimism. There is need of struggle, and much courage. All recognise the need of uplifting humanity. Would it not be well for the world if Herbert Spencer's prophecy were fulfilled, when he said in his *Ethics*:—

"Hereafter, the highest ambition of the beneficent will be to have a share—even though an utterly inappreciable and unknown share—in the making of Man."

It requires courage to stand alone, even in these days of freedom. We have many social questions facing us. A millennium is far distant. Our industrial life is seething with unrest. Are strikes and lock-outs, sabotage and boycotting to be for ever with us? These and other questions are for solution by the courageous citizen. How few recognise civic responsibility! The efficiency of our race must be preserved! And how few even consider such a subject. The records taken in the Great War time show the need of this phase of social life not being overlooked.

Out of 1,700,000 recruits in the United States,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. had superior intelligence; 9 per cent. had outstanding intelligence;  $16\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. higher intelligence; 25 per cent. ordinary intelligence; 45 per cent. below ordinary intelligence, 20 per cent. having only the intelligence of a 12-year old lad, 15 per cent. the intelligence of an 11-year old lad, and 10 per cent. only the intelligence of a 10-year old lad. And the United States have made great efforts to educate its people, and there freedom prevails. Is it any wonder that Professor Stoddard, of Harvard, in his book called "*The Revolt against Civilization*," calls the figures depressing. In Scotland also, where it was thought intelligence was high and widespread, the education and culture statistics are equally depressing. The influx of labourers of different races, for the coal and iron mines, has affected the Scottish people.

And has not there been seen in the Mother of Parliaments, conduct and scenes which show that culture after all may be only skin-deep, even among many members of one of our noblest institutions?

Inefficiency and consequent waste through want of intelligence and care injure our race. We see much mental

and moral weakness, and these are not confined to the dwellers of slums in large cities. What extravagance do we not see everywhere displayed in our social life! We spend hundreds of millions on alcohol, while many in civilized States are dying from hunger. We dress extravagantly; and to obtain pleasure from sport and entertainments millions are expended. How few have the courage to advocate better industrial relationships and a higher life, and to urge thrift and care? An American writer has said:—"One great strong unselfish soul in every community would actually redeem the world." This may be an exaggeration, but the influence of the Hebrew Prophets, the efforts of Cromwell, Lincoln and other political leaders, the life of philosophers like Kant and Spencer in their struggle for truth, and hundreds of other courageous men, show what even one personality may accomplish. There are many communities as bare of such souls as, it is said, was the region of Sodom of righteous citizens. The field of the world is ready for the work and service of men and women of courage.

If we found a considerable body of our citizens with high aims, courageous enough to struggle for the uplifting of our race would we not realise that ethical philosophy had a message for humanity? The cynic may say—"Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die," and others may feel inspired by the Persian poet Omar Khayyam. All such have not the virtue of courage. If they possessed that virtue they would exercise self-sacrifice; they would live a simple and pure life, would engage in many struggles for humanity and eschew selfish pleasures, and in so acting they would not be looking for the reward here or hereafter. In fact, as Spencer said in his book on "Justice"—"They would consider themselves insulted if told what they did was done with a view of obtaining Divine favour."

Will Spencer's faith in the future be realised? He said:—

"As the time goes on there will be more and more of those whose unselfish end will be the further evolution of humanity. While contemplating from the heights of thought, that far-off life of the race never to be enjoyed by them but only by a remote posterity, they will feel a calm pleasure in the consciousness of having aided the advance towards it."

It may be realised if our race provide men and women of courage. A courageous person is one who feels, and acts on that feeling; he believes, to quote Carlyle "That to make some human hearts wiser, manfuller, happier, more blessed, less accursed, is the work of a God."

# VAGUENESS.

By

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**R**EFLECTION on philosophical problems has convinced me that a much larger number than I used to think, or than is generally thought, are connected with the principles of symbolism, that is to say, with the relation between what means and what is meant. In dealing with highly abstract matters it is much easier to grasp the symbols (usually words) than it is to grasp what they stand for. The result of this is that almost all thinking that purports to be philosophical or logical consists in attributing to the world the properties of language. Since language really occurs, it obviously has all the properties common to all occurrences, and to that extent the metaphysic based upon linguistic considerations may not be erroneous. But language has many properties which are not shared by things in general, and when these properties intrude into our metaphysic it becomes altogether misleading. I do not think that the study of the principles of symbolism will yield any *positive* results in metaphysics, but I do think it will yield a great many negative results by enabling us to avoid fallacious inferences from symbols to things. The influence of symbolism on philosophy is mainly unconscious; if it were conscious it would do less harm. By studying the principles of symbolism we can learn not to be unconsciously influenced by language, and in this way can escape a host of erroneous notions.

Vagueness, which is my topic to-night,\* illustrates these remarks. You will no doubt think that, in the words of the poet: "Who speaks of vagueness should himself be vague." I propose to prove that all language is vague and that therefore my language is vague, but I do not wish this conclusion to be one that you could derive without the help of the syllogism. I shall be as little vague as I know how to be if I am to employ the English language. You all know that I invented a special language with a view to avoiding vagueness, but unfortunately it is unsuited for public occasions. I shall therefore, though regretfully, address you in English, and whatever vagueness is to be found in my words must be attributed to our ancestors for not having been predominantly interested in logic.

There is a certain tendency in those who have realised that words are vague to infer that things also are vague. We hear a great deal about the flux and the continuum and the unanalysability of the Universe, and it is often suggested that

\*Read before the Jowett Society, Oxford.

as our language becomes more precise, it becomes less adapted to represent the primitive chaos out of which man is supposed to have evolved the cosmos. This seems to me precisely a case of the fallacy of verbalism—the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example. They have to do with the relation between a representation and that which it represents. Apart from representation, whether cognitive or mechanical, there can be no such thing as vagueness or precision; things are what they are, and there is an end of it. Nothing is more or less what it is, or to a certain extent possessed of the properties which it possesses. Idealism has produced habits of confusion even in the minds of those who think that they have rejected it. Ever since Kant there has been a tendency in philosophy to confuse knowledge with what is known. It is thought that there must be some kind of identity between the knower and the known, and hence the knower infers that the known also is muddled-headed. All this identity of knower and known, and all this supposed intimacy of the relation of knowing, seems to me a delusion. Knowing is an occurrence having a certain relation to some other occurrence, or groups of occurrences, or characteristic of a group of occurrences, which constitutes what is said to be known. When knowledge is vague, this does not apply to the knowing as an occurrence; as an occurrence it is incapable of being either vague or precise, just as all other occurrences are. Vagueness in a cognitive occurrence is a characteristic of its relation to that which is known, not a characteristic of the occurrence in itself.

Let us consider the various ways in which common words are vague, and let us begin with such a word as "red." It is perfectly obvious, since colours form a continuum, that there are shades of colour concerning which we shall be in doubt whether to call them red or not, not because we are ignorant of the meaning of the word "red," but because it is a word the extent of whose application is essentially doubtful. This, of course, is the answer to the old puzzle about the man who went bald. It is supposed that at first he was not bald, that he lost his hairs one by one, and that in the end he was bald; therefore, it is argued, there must have been one hair the loss of which converted him into a bald man. This, of course, is absurd. Baldness is a vague conception; some men are certainly bald, some are certainly not bald, while between them there are men of whom it is not true to say they must either be bald or not bald. The law of excluded middle is true when precise symbols are employed, but it is not true when symbols

are vague, as, in fact, all symbols are. All words describing sensible qualities have the same kind of vagueness which belongs to the word "red." This vagueness exists also, though in a lesser degree, in the quantitative words which science has tried hardest to make precise, such as a metre or a second. I am not going to invoke Einstein for the purpose of making these words vague. The metre, for example, is defined as the distance between two marks on a certain rod in Paris, when that rod is at a certain temperature. Now the marks are not points, but patches of a finite size, so that the distance between them is not a precise conception. Moreover, temperature cannot be measured with more than a certain degree of accuracy, and the temperature of a rod is never quite uniform. For all these reasons the conception of a metre is lacking in precision. The same applies to a second. The second is defined by relation to the rotation of the earth, but the earth is not a rigid body, and two parts of the earth's surface do not take exactly the same time to rotate; moreover all observations have a margin of error. There are some occurrences of which we can say that they take less than a second to happen, and others of which we can say that they take more, but between the two there will be a number of occurrences of which we believe that they do not all last equally long, but of none of which we can say whether they last more or less than a second. Therefore, when we say an occurrence lasts a second, all that it is worth while to mean is that no possible accuracy of observation will show whether it lasts more or less than a second.

Now let us take proper names. I pass by the irrelevant fact that the same proper name often belongs to many people. I once knew a man called Ebenezer Wilkes Smith, and I decline to believe that anybody else ever had this name. You might say, therefore, that here at last we have discovered an unambiguous symbol. This, however, would be a mistake. Mr. Ebenezer Wilkes Smith was born, and being born is a gradual process. It would seem natural to suppose that the name was not attributable before birth; if so, there was doubt, while birth was taking place, whether the name was attributable or not. If it be said that the name was attributable before birth, the ambiguity is even more obvious, since no one can decide how long before birth the name become attributable. Death also is a process; even when it is what is called instantaneous, death must occupy a finite time. If you continue to apply the name of the corpse, there must gradually come a stage in decomposition when the name ceases to be attributable, but no one can say precisely when this stage has been

reached. The fact is that all words are attributable without doubt over a certain area, but become questionable within a penumbra, outside which they are again certainly not attributable. Someone might seek to obtain precision in the use of words by saying that no word is to be applied in the penumbra, but fortunately the penumbra itself is not accurately definable, and all the vaguenesses which apply to the primary use of words apply also when we try to fix a limit to their indubitable applicability. This has a reason in our physiological constitution. Stimuli which for various reasons we believe to be different produce in us indistinguishable sensations. It is not clear whether the sensations are really different like their stimuli and only our power to discriminate between sensations is deficient, or whether the sensations themselves are sometimes identical in relevant respects even when the stimuli differ in relevant respects. This is a kind of question which the theory of quanta at some much later stage in its development may be able to answer, but for the present it may be left in doubt. For our purpose it is not the vital question. What is clear is that the knowledge that we can obtain through our sensations is not as fine-grained as the stimuli to those sensations. We cannot see with the naked eye the difference between two glasses of water of which one is wholesome while the other is full of typhoid bacilli. In this case a microscope enables us to see the difference, but in the absence of a microscope the difference is only inferred from the differing effects of things which are sensibly indistinguishable. It is this fact that things which our senses do not distinguish produce different effects—as, for example, one glass of water gives you typhoid while the other does not—that has led us to regard the knowledge derived from the senses as vague. And the vagueness of the knowledge derived from the senses infects all words in the definition of which there is a sensible element. This includes all words which contain geographical and chronological constituents, such as “Julius Caesar,” “the twentieth century,” or the “solar system.”

There remains a more abstract class of words: first words which apply to all parts of time and space, such as “matter” or “causality”; secondly, the words of pure logic. I shall leave out of discussion the first class of words, since all of them raise great difficulties, and I can scarcely imagine a human being who would deny that they are all more or less vague. I come therefore to the words of pure logic, words such as “or” and “not”. Are these words also vague or have they a precise meaning?

Words such as “or” and “not” might seem at first sight,

to have a perfectly precise meaning: " $p$  or  $q$ " is true when  $p$  is true, true when  $q$  is true, and false when both are false. But the trouble is that this involves the notions of "true" and "false"; and it will be found, I think, that all the concepts of logic involve these notions, directly or indirectly. Now "true" and "false" can only have a *precise* meaning when the symbols employed—words, perceptions, images, or what not—are themselves precise. We have seen that, in practice, this is not the case. It follows that every proposition that can be framed in practice has a certain degree of vagueness; that is to say, there is not one definite fact necessary and sufficient for its truth, but a certain region of possible facts, any one of which would make it true. And this region is itself ill-defined: we cannot assign to it a definite boundary. This is the difference between vagueness and generality. A proposition involving a general concept—e.g. "This is a man"—will be verified by a number of facts, such as "This" being Brown or Jones or Robinson. But if "man" were a precise idea, the set of possible facts that would verify "this is a man" would be quite definite. Since, however, the conception "man" is more or less vague, it is possible to discover prehistoric specimens concerning which there is not, even in theory, a definite answer to the question, "Is this a man?" As applied to such specimens, the proposition "this is a man" is neither definitely true nor definitely false. Since all non-logical words have this kind of vagueness, it follows that the conceptions of truth and falsehood, as applied to propositions composed of or containing non-logical words, are themselves more or less vague. Since propositions containing non-logical words are the substructure on which logical propositions are built, it follows that logical propositions also, so far as we can know them, become vague through the vagueness of "truth" and "falsehood." We can see an ideal of precision, to which we can approximate indefinitely; but we cannot attain this ideal. Logical words, like the rest, when used by human beings, share the vagueness of all other words. There is, however, less vagueness about logical words than about the words of daily life, because logical words apply essentially to symbols, and may be conceived as applying rather to possible than to actual symbols. We are capable of imagining what a precise symbolism would be, though we cannot actually construct such a symbolism. Hence we are able to *imagine* a precise meaning for such words as "or" and "not." We can, in fact, see precisely what they would mean if our symbolism were precise. All traditional logic habitually assumes that precise symbols are being employed. It is therefore not

applicable to this terrestrial life, but only to an imagined celestial existence. Where, however, this celestial existence would differ from ours, so far as logic is concerned, would be not in the nature of what is known, but only in the accuracy of our knowledge. Therefore, if the hypothesis of a precise symbolism enables us to draw any inferences as to what is symbolised, there is no reason to distrust such inferences merely on the ground that our actual symbolism is not precise. We are able to conceive precision; indeed, if we could not do so, we could not conceive vagueness, which is merely the contrary of precision. This is one reason why logic takes us nearer to heaven than most other studies. On this point I agree with Plato. But those who dislike logic will, I fear, find my heaven disappointing.

It is now time to tackle the definition of vagueness. Vagueness, though it applies primarily to what is cognitive, is a conception, applicable to every kind of representation—for example, a photograph, or a barograph. But before defining vagueness it is necessary to define accuracy. One of the most easily intelligible definitions of accuracy is as follows: One structure is an accurate representation of another when the words describing the one will also describe the other by being given new meanings. For example, "Brutus killed Caesar" has the same structure as "Plato loved Socrates," because both can be represented by the symbol " $x R y$ ," by giving suitable meanings to  $x$  and  $R$  and  $y$ . But this definition, though easy to understand, does not give the essence of the matter, since the introduction of words describing the two systems is irrelevant. The exact definition is as follows: One system of terms related in various ways is an accurate representation of another system of terms related in various other ways if there is a one-one relation of the terms of the one to the terms of the other, and likewise a one-one relation of the relations of the one to the relations of the other, such that, when two or more terms in the one system have a relation belonging to that system, the corresponding terms of the other system have the corresponding relation belonging to the other system. Maps, charts, photographs, catalogues, etc., all come within this definition in so far as they are accurate.

*Per contra*, a representation is *vague* when the relation of the representing system to the represented system is not one-one, but one-many. For example, a photograph which is so smudged that it might equally represent Brown or Jones or Robinson is vague. A small-scale map is usually vaguer than a large-scale map, because it does not show all the turns and twists of the roads, rivers, etc., so that various slightly differ-

ent courses are compatible with the representation that it gives. Vagueness, clearly, is a matter of degree, depending upon the extent of the possible differences between different systems represented by the same representation. Accuracy, on the contrary, is an ideal limit.

Passing from representation in general to the kinds of representation that are specially interesting to the logician, the representing system will consist of words, perceptions, thoughts, or something of the kind, and the would-be one-one relation between the representing system and the represented system will be *meaning*. In an accurate language, meaning would be a one-one relation; no word would have two meanings, and no two words would have the same meaning. In actual languages, as we have seen, meaning is one-many. (It happens often that two words have the same meaning, but this is easily avoided, and can be assumed not to happen without injuring the argument.) That is to say, there is not only one object that a word means, and not only one possible fact that will verify a proposition. The fact that meaning is a one-many relation is the precise statement of the fact that all language is more or less vague. There is, however, a complication about language as a method of representing a system, namely, that words which mean relations are not themselves relations, but just as substantial or unsubstantial as other words. In this respect a map, for instance, is superior to language, since the fact that one place is to the west of another is represented by the fact that the corresponding place on the map is to the left of the other; that is to say, a relation is represented by a relation. But in language this is not the case. Certain relations of higher order are represented by relations, in accordance with the rules of syntax. For example, "A precedes B" and "B precedes A" have different meanings, because the order of the words is an essential part of the meaning of the sentence. But this does not hold of elementary relations; the word "precedes," though it means a relation, is not a relation. I believe that this single fact is at the bottom of the hopeless muddle which has prevailed in *all* schools of philosophy as to the nature of relation. It would, however, take me too far from my present theme to pursue this line of thought.

It may be said: How do you know that all knowledge is vague, and what does it matter if it is? The case which I took before, of two glasses of water, one of which is wholesome while the other gives you typhoid, will illustrate both points. Without

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(A word is a class of series, and both classes and series are logical fictions. See "Analysis of Mind," chapter x; "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy," chapter xvii.)

calling in the microscope, it is obvious that what you see of a man who is 200 yards away is vague compared to what you see of a man who is 2 feet away; that is to say, many men who look quite different when seen close at hand look indistinguishable at a distance, while men who look different at a distance never look indistinguishable when seen close at hand. Therefore, according to the definition there is less vagueness in the near appearance than in the distant one. There is still less vagueness about the appearance under the microscope. It is perfectly ordinary facts of this kind that prove the vagueness of most of our knowledge, and lead us to infer the vagueness of all of it.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that vague knowledge must be false. On the contrary, a vague belief has a much better chance of being true than a precise one, because there are more possible facts that would verify it. If I believe that so-and-so is tall, I am more likely to be right than if I believe that his height is between 6ft. 2in. and 6ft 3in. In regard to beliefs and propositions, though not in regard to single words, we can distinguish between accuracy and precision. A belief is *precise* when only one fact would verify it; it is *accurate* when it is both precise and true. Precision diminishes the likelihood of truth, but often increases the pragmatic value of a belief if it is true—for example, in the case of the water that contained the typhoid bacilli. Science is perpetually trying to substitute more precise beliefs for vague ones; this makes it harder for a scientific proposition to be true than for the vague beliefs of uneducated persons to be true, but makes scientific truth better worth having if it can be obtained.

Vagueness in our knowledge is, I believe, merely a particular case of a general law of physics, namely, the law that what may be called the appearances of a thing at different places are less and less differentiated as we get further away from the thing. When I speak of "appearances" I am speaking of something purely physical—the sort of thing, in fact, that, if it is visual, can be photographed. From a close-up photograph it is possible to infer a photograph of the same object at a distance, while the contrary inference is much more precarious. That is to say, there is a one-many relation between distant and close-up appearances. Therefore the distant appearance, regarded as a representation of the close-up appearance, is vague according to our definition. I think all vagueness in language and thought is essentially analogous to this vagueness which may exist in a photograph. My own belief is that most of the problems of epistemology, in so far

as they are genuine, are really problems of physics and physiology; moreover, I believe that physiology is only a complicated branch of physics. The habit of treating knowledge as something mysterious and wonderful seems to me unfortunate. People do not say that a barometer "knows" when it is going to rain; but I doubt if there is any essential difference in this respect between the barometer and the meteorologist who observes it. There is only one philosophical theory which seems to me in a position to ignore physics, and that is solipsism. If you are willing to believe that nothing exists except what you directly experience, no other person can prove that you are wrong, and probably no valid arguments exist against your view. But if you are going to allow any inferences from what you directly experience to other entities, then physics supplies the safest form of such inferences. And I believe that (apart from illegitimate problems derived from misunderstood symbolism) physics, in its modern forms, supplies materials for answers to all philosophical problems that are capable of being answered, except the one problem raised by solipsism, namely: Is there any valid inference ever from an entity experienced to one inferred? On this problem, I see no refutation of the sceptical position. But the sceptical philosophy is so short as to be uninteresting; therefore it is natural for a person who has learnt to philosophise to work out other alternatives, even if there is no very good ground for regarding them as preferable.



# PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN ITS RELATION TO TRADITIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.\*

By

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I SHALL assume a general acquaintance with the principles of psycho-analysis. You all know that its fundamental conception is that of the "repressed wish," that a wish, as psychoanalysts regard it, is a movement of our very being, saturated with our feeling, and involving life itself. You also know of Freud's contention that wishes which conflict with our better and more social self tend, in spite of their urgent nature, to be repressed by us into what he is pleased to call the "unconscious." You will remember, too, that this is not the last one hears of such dismissed wishes, that they are for ever trying to express or realise themselves, that this persistent striving of the unconscious wish requires that some sort of "resistance" to its re-entry into consciousness should be established; that Freud finds this resistance in the social, ethical, and religious principles which had already repressed the wish because of its incompatibility with themselves. You are aware that he calls this resistance the "censor of consciousness," imagining it as an active sentinel stationed, not at the entrance to explicit consciousness, but at the junction of the "fore-conscious" and the "unconscious," so that the mental conflicts with which he is concerned go on in the unconscious, that is, below the level of explicit consciousness. This is important to remember if one is adequately to comprehend Freud's view of mental conflict and his reason for saying that a patient who is being subjected to analysis, is unable to tell the physician the cause of his illness or the nature of his mental distress; there has supervened upon the repression an *amnesia*, or loss of memory, for the repressed wish, since its incompatibility with the personality makes it unwelcome and disturbing. You are aware that during sleep, and perhaps at other times, the censor or resistance is off guard to some extent, or manifests a lessened vigilance; that while this lessening of vigilance is usually insufficient to allow of an unabashed re-entry of the repressed wish, yet it does permit of return, provided the wish distort itself enough to be unrecognised by the censor as the old enemy. It is this process of distortion which is said to produce the dream and the neurotic symptom, the pursuit of

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\*This and the following paper were read before the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy at its General Meeting held on May 19th, 1923.

which, back to the original wish, as cause, is quite an elaborate business, calling for the use of a special technique of "free association," based upon the conception of "determinism." Again, you remember how, at first, Freud believed that it was only necessary to recover the repressed wish for the symptom to disappear and the patient to be cured; in short, how the patient was cured by what Freud called "abreaction"—the patient's life-stream had become "fixated" upon a past pathogenic experience from which he is now released. You are aware that Freud has introduced a number of modifications into his theory since that early date. For example, you will recall his distinction between the "primary mental system" determined by the "pleasure-pain principle" and the "secondary mental system" determined by the "reality principle." You remember how the person who is subject to the pleasure-pain principle shrinks from stark reality when that reality refuses him his pleasure, or threatens his life with pain and irking discomfort; how, on the other hand, the individual who is governed by the reality principle, eschewing his pleasure and ignoring his pain, confronts reality with vigour and determination. The former is a victim of weakness, the latter a votary of strength. You know how it follows from this distinction that the shrinking weakness of the former may cause him more and more to turn away from the unkind world of reality; how he learns to get from his own wishes and day-dreams, the pleasure of which the real world was so niggard. There is an ever-continuing relapse into the primary mental system and an ever-deepening domination by the pleasure-pain principle. This process is, as you know, called by Freud "regression." Further, this process of flight from real facts may go on until the individual becomes as unfit to manage his life, as afraid of stern reality, as petulant and impatient as a child. It is such cases which give rise to the expression, "regression into the infantile." Finally, you will not have forgotten that what regresses is, for Freud, the *libido* or sexual life of the neurotic. It then followed that the mental difficulties of such an one arose from conflict between his individual and his social tendencies; the former seek the person's comfort and pleasure, the latter, conformation to others and to the outside world. Thus there appears the term, "narcissism" or self-love, meaning preoccupation with the pleasures of self as distinct from the dutiful acceptance of obligations to others. But of the ego-tendencies it was the sexual urge that was masterful and destructive through regression.

It is now our task to consider those various conceptions *seriatim* and in the light of traditional psychology.

1. For the Freudian "wish" traditional psychology would substitute the concept of "conation." The word "wish" is too conscious in its reference properly to connote the deep-seated, primitive urge of life with which one is always dealing in dynamic psychology. The word "conation" does imply the whole full-blooded urgency of life. This is not merely a quibble about terms, but remains fundamental to the issues involved. The word "conation" brings up before us the whole press of primitive life-force with its inescapable interest, romance, feverishness and distress. We are thus made aware of an undercurrent of driving power, present from the beginning, at work in vague feeling throughout all animal activities before the advent of articulate consciousness or intelligence, and which is present still, beneath and within rational process and spiritual endeavour. Should Freud agree to substitute this general concept of "conation" for his restricted concept of "wish," he would be driven to include in his account of the neuroses other vital tendencies than the sexual. While it does not suit his theory to include them, it is the business of the impartial psychologist to do so in order to secure full recognition of the facts. The traditional psychologist has no pre-occupation; he is not concerned to construct a psychology of convenience in order to support a theory. One cannot help feeling that Freud is at times subject to this fallacy; indeed, it would seem that many of his arguments are marked examples of special pleading. Yet the substitution of the concept of conation would place psycho-analysis on both a sounder and more acceptable basis, even though it would require a revision of the sexual theory of neuroses. For the traditional psychologist, conation is a correlate of instinctive organisation. It expresses the fact that, in instinct, life-energy became articulate for its own benefit; in instinct the original sprawling life-force has been given more or less specific direction, been directed upon certain classes of stimuli. When the stimulus appears, the energy of the instinct is released as an impulse on the merely instinctive level, as a wish or desire when intelligent insight into meanings comes to complicate the merely animal mind of instinct.

2. To explain conflict we need but appeal to the biological conception of the unity of the organism. The existence of this unity is as much beyond question as its importance; though Freud seems to give it little notice. An instinct does not work like a reflex action, locally and without involving us in emotion. An instinct can only fulfil its end if it work through the whole organism. It is a sectional organisation subordinated to the service of the whole at least to the extent

of having to capture the whole before it can fulfil its end. This it cannot do while in competition with some opposing instinctive tendency which an inconsiderate environment, teeming with stimuli, has simultaneously aroused to activity. The conflict of tendencies which then arises, goes on until one of the competing conations wins. Having thus gained mastery of the organism, it is able to discharge the energy of its instinctive mechanism into the motor tracts and so become action. I have myself seen a horse caught between flight and curiosity, between fear and wonder, so that for an appreciable time no positive direction was given to action. The animal neither fled nor approached. Such conflicts have a purely biological basis at first, whatever changes come over the conflict on the higher level of insight into the meaning of the competing tendencies. Traditional psychology holds the view that, right to the end, even our spiritual struggles are in one aspect an extension of instinctive conflict. A conflict of desires is a conflict of enlightened impulses. Man is all of a piece; he is not only spiritual but also physical, and his mental life is continuous with his biological preparation. He is a psycho-physical being. This does not mean that no new principle can appear when the higher level is reached, but only that we cannot explain man, nor the working of his mind, unless we take into account his origins. Conflict, then, is at first biologically conditioned, and naturally projects itself into the mental life which providence thought fit to set in a house of clay.

In none of his writings have I found Freud expound conflict in this way. The importance of doing so, however, becomes clear when it is seen that, if conflict can go on in a low organism in this way—that is, on the level of *mere vague feeling* so that the creature knows not the meaning of the strife—then we have already there what has been mysteriously called “unconscious” conflict. And it follows, that on the higher level of reason our vigilant perception of the meaning of the conflict may for some cause weaken, leaving men, too, the victims of an unconscious conflict, of a condition of distress which they do not understand. This lapse of vigilant control actually does take place when the emotions aroused by the conflict are overwhelmingly passionate, when we are one with an excited mob, when ignorance of our own nature allows the conflict to breed in our minds a vast confusion which leaves us terrifyingly adrift from our moorings, and when the stress of the conflict is so intolerable to a weak nature that relief is blindly sought in instinctive repression.

But there are two kinds of repression, which I shall call “instinctive” and “considered” repression respectively. There

is a native tendency to seek the pleasurable and the comfortable, and to avoid the painful and the uncomfortable. Like any other instinct, it may work, when we are off guard, without the control of volition. Afterwards, we are not in any proper sense aware of what was besetting us, or of what we repressed. This tendency, too, has come to us from our biological past. Observation of lowly creatures will find them everywhere living in just this way, following their feelings with no high knowledge of the meaning of their actions. In a conflict between a meaner impulse and the self-esteem of his integrated personality, a man may, in order to be rid of the scorching shame of its incompatibility, indulge blindly in this kind of instinctive repression. But an impulse once aroused must either be expressed or transmuted by honest judgment. In instinctive repression neither of these conditions is fulfilled. The emotional aspect of the impulse remains unsatisfied and the impulse itself still dynamic, so that it becomes a source of physical and mental disturbance. If, on the other hand, the impulse gets its way, one must put up with the consequences of its incompatibility with one's beliefs and aims. But there is the third course, taken by the strong, namely, to confront the conflict and endure its agony until frank and fearless thought has fully examined its whole meaning, and clear reasons have been found for rejection of the incompatible impulse. When this has been done the unseemly conation can be rejected with full knowledge and without harm, for even the rejection has been integrated with the rest of one's mind; at the same time, the emotion proper to the rejected conation is transmuted into the relieving emotion of satisfaction which always accompanies the solution of our problems, and whereby alone we can become really happy. This kind of repression can harm no one. Indeed, it issues in strength, integrity, and honesty. With that the secret is out; man must live by the truth, and the truth will keep him whole. That is the conclusion from a discussion of repression along the lines of traditional psychology. Of these important considerations, however, you will learn little from Freud, so that the result of an uncritical acceptance of his principles has been the assertion that repression is a bad thing. This is true of unconsidered repression, but of the other kind of repression such an assertion knows nothing, and therefore comes to be made without qualification and to the hurt of society and the moral life. The truth is that it is by enlightened repression alone that we have reached the measure of control to which all good citizens have already attained.

3. For Freud the "unconscious" is made up of repressed wishes. Furthermore, the kind of repression meant is instinc-

tive repression. As we have recorded above, the confused, troubled, unenlightened state of mind that marks instinctive repression is already a partial explanation of the unconscious nature of repressed conations, as also of *amnesia* or forgetting. The fact is that, during the conflict, we were never clear about the meaning of what was going on. But we can still further account for the quality of "unconsciousness" by calling in the aid of two conceptions from traditional psychology. These are (1) the conception of a *psychical disposition* and (2) that of *inhibition*.

The psychical disposition is said to result from the establishment of a neural disposition through either (a) repetition, or (b) the intensity of an impression. Thus appears a short circuit for the passage of the nerve current, which then does not rise above a sub-cortical centre and so does not reach the level of conscious perception. The disposition is then capable of being latently influential without coming under the scrutiny of explicit attention; and what does not come within the range of attention is *ipso facto* out of the control of the will. In this way, sometimes deliberately, sometimes unwittingly, we are continually remitting modes of behaviour from the control of critical consciousness to the tender mercies of automatism. It is one of the great principles of mental economy, without which we should never be in a position to attack the solution of new problems. But it must imply the existence of a vast number of latent forces more or less ordered and managed by inhibitions from the controlling personality.

Again, conations which have not been short-circuited and which have not been robbed of their power by conscious insight may remain submerged, trembling just beneath the threshold of consciousness and suffering a sustained inhibition by those elements of critical consciousness with which they are at variance. The unity of the psycho-physical being renders impossible the supremacy of two strongly-toned, rival trends at once. One tendency alone can be supreme, and supremacy is most likely to go to that one which is favoured by its congruity with the synthetic personality. Further, experiment shows that there is little room in focal consciousness for two competing trends at once. It follows that, if one become supreme, the other cannot for sheer lack of room. During the conflict an *association of antagonism* has been formed such that, at any later time when the conquering trend is not occupying attention, any attempt at re-entry into consciousness by the conquered trend will automatically awaken it to vigilant opposition, just as the appearance of "A" automatically calls up "B."

4. Consequently, the incompatible conation meets with a sustained "resistance" really exerted by the principles and purposes of the integrated personality to which the incompatible conation is opposed and which Freud vaguely but picturesquely calls the "censor of consciousness." The "censor" is our formed self, resisting onslaughts upon its integrity. One may fairly object to the needless vagueness and to the unscientific terminology which mark Freud's exposition. Censorship of consciousness, then, is for the traditional psychologist nothing else than the natural resistance of the personality system to that which is repugnant to it.

5. When we realise that the chief concern of explicit consciousness is with our *unsolved* problems, and that the personality system is a habit system, working independently of explicit consciousness, we can understand why the association of antagonism referred to, will operate below the level of clear consciousness and the conflict continue in the "unconscious."

6. This should render it unnecessary to introduce the term "fore-conscious." For Freud the "unconscious" is filled with repressed wishes that are subject to a persistent resistance, whereas the "fore-conscious" contains those elements which may become conscious without resistance. The censor of consciousness is figured as situated at the junction of the unconscious and the fore-conscious. Traditional psychology finds this account too artificial and too spatial adequately to represent the truth about mind. The simple truth seems to be that the suppressed incompatibles which make up Freud's "unconscious," are automatically resisted by the established personality system through associations of antagonism, while the compatible trends which make up Freud's "fore-conscious," meet with no automatic resistance, and may re-enter consciousness at any time.

7. If the resistance can be removed, the *amnesia* for the repressed conation is overcome, and it can be dealt with in an enlightened way so that dissociation gives place to integration. The fact that the repressed wish is recoverable shows that it was not forgotten in any real sense, but only persistently resisted. If, however, we insist upon calling this suspension of memory a forgetting, then we had better call it pathological forgetting in order to distinguish it from true forgetting, fading out, or obliviscence. Of this kind of forgetting one hears little in psycho-analysis. Yet experiment in psychology has established the fact of such forgetting, and is able to measure the amount so forgotten in a given time. The fact may be of no use to Freud, because his interest is mainly patholo-

gical; but in that case psycho-analytic theory should make no attempt to supersede traditional theory.

8. The technique for recovery of the repressed experience is that of "free association" based upon the conception of "psychological determinism." The conception was taken directly from traditional psychology, and to traditional psychology belongs the merit of research upon the formation of associations. Again, "determinism" is a conception without which psychology could never have become a science at all. Still, it must be granted that Freud's determined use of determinism has been most meritorious and profitable.

9. In a patient suffering from psycho-neurosis, there follows upon the recovery of the repressed experience a certain amount of relief, and sometimes even the immediate disappearance of grave symptoms. Freud ascribed such results to "abreaction." Open confession is good for the soul. But does not this mean that the patient need never have fallen ill of his experience if he had been able mentally to adjust himself to it at the time of its occurrence? The inference is that one should confront the circumstances of one's life with fortitude. Naturally, it is not easy to face facts that are painful. For this reason, unconsidered repression will continue to be the resort of our characteristic folly. And, by contrast, it becomes plain how vastly important it is that repression and self-discipline should be illuminated by a clear comprehension of the facts, by wise judgment. Man may not live by a foolish self-deception, practised to avoid the discomfort of a passing pain.

10. But there are many cases in which symptoms do not disappear magically by abreaction. These are cases in which the neurotic symptoms have been gradually built up by phantasy rather than suddenly produced by shock. The appeal to phantasy as a cause of psycho-neuroses enabled Freud to account for the fact that persons fell ill through brooding upon disabilities which others bravely faced and overcame. He claims to have discovered two mental systems in all people—the primary mental system in which the attention is captured by considerations of pleasure and pain, and the secondary mental system in which a real purpose is strongly pursued in spite of momentary discomfort and pain. Man's fight is with reality which has an objective existence that is often cruel in its cynical indifference to his wishes. The strong man lives on the frontiers of his mind, where his purposes impinge upon the inertia and opposition of real circumstances, demanding modification of both them and his wishes until a suitable mental adjustment had been found. The weak and the sensitive tend to withdraw from the frontiers where this exacting

struggle for spiritual poise is going on. But they must have satisfaction of some sort, and, not enjoying that of a real adjustment to the real world, they grow to look for it among the phantasies that play about their wishes. They are now seeking pleasure and avoiding discomfort, and they find resort to phantasy an easy road to both. These phantasies, according to Freud, will lead back to memories of times when the individual had no need to struggle, when everything was done for him, to memories of childhood, in short. As a result there comes about that "regression into the infantile" of which one hears so much in psycho-analysis. We get, then, a person who is infantile in behaviour and misadapted to the world of his fellows. His behaviour is no longer that of the normal man, but rather that of the neurotic.

This account of man's struggle with reality is distinctly impressive. It reveals clearly recesses of entanglement from which hysterical symptoms arise, and at the same time throws a flood of light upon the moral conflict.

The primary mental system seems to be another name for the instinctive tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain which has long been one of the recorded facts of traditional psychology; while the secondary mental system is typified by the strong motor tendencies of those who seek after self-control of all their volitional processes.

11. The person whose *libido*, or life-stream, has regressed in the way described, is said to have his attention "fixated" upon some earlier stage of development beyond which he should have permanently progressed. His condition is now one in which his ego tendencies are being served at the expense of his social tendencies. This is another way of expressing his failure of adjustment to his fellows. The devotion to one's ego Freud calls "narcissism," or self-love, a term which has for him a very wide significance, for it ranges in meaning from auto-eroticism to what traditional psychology would be content to call self-assertion.

12. This whole question of fixation, regression and narcissism is the question of the role of sex in Freud's system. A critical examination of this aspect of psycho-analytic theory will be found in a recent monograph upon "Dreams," published by this Association.<sup>1</sup> I have there endeavoured to show how the primitive urge of life, beginning in the tendency of life to maintain itself and working through race- and self-preservation, has in the course of evolution become articulate for its

1. "Dreams", 2nd Impression, pp. 57-60. Monograph Series, No. II. of The Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, Sydney, 1923.

own benefit. In other words, life has been given direction in many appropriate reactions which are instinctive, and which serve the creature's welfare. Among these are the Parental instinct, the Sex instinct, the Gregarious or Herd instinct, Pugnacity, Flight and Concealment, Curiosity, Repulsion, Self-assertion, Self-abasement, and so on. To reduce all these to *libido*, to the one activity of sex instead of to that of vital energy is Freud's fundamental error. It leads him, for example, to seek the cause of all neuroses in the difficulties which arise from sex. It has been quite clearly shown, however, that baulked self-assertion is a frequent cause of mental disorder.<sup>2</sup> Again, Trotter has shown the great importance of the pressure exerted upon the individual through the herd instinct.<sup>3</sup> Then, too, the war neuroses have demonstrated that paralysing fear is a fruitful source of mental derangement.<sup>4</sup> Finally, it seems to me that repulsion might well play an effective part in the aetiology of neuroses.

13. Freud also regards as indicative of the activity of unconscious wishes, the errors and blunders which one makes. In his book, "The Psychopathology of Everyday Life," he gives many interesting examples. A great many of these are wholly convincing. Still, this aspect of his system is open to some criticism. In the monograph already mentioned<sup>5</sup>, I have adduced evidence to show that there is a mechanical side to mind which produces condensations and displacements without any relation whatever to the presence of repressed wishes. If this evidence be regarded as satisfactory, then the conclusion follows that an unconscious conation does not cleverly construct the condensation or displace the emphasis in order to defeat the censor of consciousness, but rather makes use of condensations and displacements of emphasis already produced by mental mechanism. In that case it would be unjustifiable to regard every blunder, every slip, as indicative of a repressed wish.

14. Never, perhaps, in the history of science has there been so deliberate a refusal to consider and include the large body of ascertained fact accumulated throughout years by a patient, sincere and competent group of scientists as is manifested in Freud's attitude towards the knowledge gathered by traditional psychology. Until recently, he thrust it all aside

2. See Adler: "The Neurotic Constitution".

3. "The Herd Instinct in Peace and War".

4. For the Psycho-analysts' view of the War Neuroses see "Psycho-analysis and the War Neuroses", the International Psycho-analytical Library, No. 2, London, 1921.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-67.

with a contempt which raises our first suspicion of his scientific pretensions. One must, of course, yield him the point that originality is only too often thwarted by existing theories and systems of knowledge, and that it can sometimes only succeed and be fruitful by a total rejection of existing systems. Still, an innovator must be aware of the risk of being wrong, and that the whole group of investigators in the traditional sequence cannot have been altogether futile enquirers. Further, he should know that a deliberate, conservative approach may arrive at the same truths with less admixture of error. Finally, he should remember that an obligation falls automatically upon every scientist to reconcile and make consistent with established knowledge his own system.

In two recent publications, however, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" and "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," he has undertaken the consideration of certain contributions made by traditional psychology; but the examination is vitiated by his preoccupations. I shall take only one example of this, his view of instinct as set forth in the first of the publications just cited.<sup>1</sup> He regards an instinct as "a tendency innate in living organic matter, impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition." Instinct is therefore conservative and it is historically determined. He then draws the inference that instinct is seeking, as the "final goal of all organic striving . . . an ancient starting point" of life, that "If we may assume as an experience admitting of no exception that everything living dies from causes within itself, and returns to the inorganic, we can only say '*The goal of all life is death.*'"

To me these inferences are so unwarranted as to be ridiculous. His inferences are vitiated, first, by the fact that his necessity requires him to bring the conception of instinct under subservience to his theory of regression; secondly, by the fact that he treats instinct as an entity in itself; thirdly, by the fact that he assumes conservatism in living matter to be equivalent to a lifeless rigidity, a contradiction in terms. Finally, we know from observation that instincts, just because they are not independent entities, can be made to subserve the highest ends of personality and human progress.

Yet it is just this last point which Freud has established so clearly in his important conception of "sublimation." And

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1. "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", pp. 44-47. The International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 4. London, 1922.

Psychology and Politics, by W. H. R. Rivers, LL.D., F.R.S., etc. *Conflict and Dream*, by the same author. (12/6 each). Kegan Paul, New York, 1923.

this fact may allow one to conclude with a frank and willing acknowledgment of the greatly increased fruitfulness that has accrued to psychology from Freud's extensive and valuable discoveries. Despite the criticisms which have been offered in this paper, and which, owing to its brevity, had to be made without adequate qualification, acknowledgments are due to Freud's genius for his insistence upon the deeper sources of human personality, upon the indirectness with which subconscious elements may express themselves, upon the dynamic nature of mental activity, and upon the deep significance of the pleasure-pain principle. This debt is increased by his revelation of the meaning of the dream and by his uncompromising use of the conception of psychological determinism.



# PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND EDUCATION.

By

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THE recent growth of the practice and theory of mental analysis has brought to the attention of teachers and others the question of its bearing on education. In what ways is psycho-analysis likely to influence the work of school education? It is thought that both the theory and practice of education will be greatly modified by this new knowledge of and treatment for the mind. A recent writer informs us that "a new science and application of pedagogy are being reared upon the data obtained by psycho-analysis";\* though it may be suggested that an examination of the structure hardly reveals the novelty claimed. Another writer remarks that "we are probably on the eve of discoveries which will help to provide a rational analytic technique which can be passed on for the use of the teacher."\* On the other hand, Dr. William Brown tells us that "a knowledge of the modern theory and practice of mental analysis is very important to teachers and parents," "but not," he adds, "that the child may be analysed."†

In what ways, then, is this knowledge important to the teacher? For the successful practice of his craft the teacher requires scientific knowledge as well as skill. The knowledge needed is of three sorts: (1) of the ends sought, (2) of the means to be employed, and (3) of the human material to be educated. The methods employed by the educator will be very largely determined by the aims proposed and the nature and mode of growth of those who are being educated.

The aims sought may be changed or modified by evidence derived from the practice of psycho-analysis. So far there is little evidence of any such change. But it may be noted that the current trend of educational and social theory is confirmed by the work of the psycho-analyst. The young are to be trained for freedom and independence through a gradual loosening of family and school control. "The lessons of psycho-analysis for the most part merely reinforce educational aims and aspirations of which we had already and independently become aware." Only in respect to the attachment and affection of a child to his parents does the writer think that psycho-analysis has shown the need for a change of

\*Quoted by Adams—Modern Developments in Educational Practice, p. 249.

†Times Educational Supplement, Jan. 23rd., 1923, p. 22.

attitude. And even here it would seem that the trend of thought has been towards the recognition of the need for a loosening of the ties of affection hitherto customary. For instance, the views of Mrs. Wetham in her recent book, "The Upbringing of Daughters," clearly illustrate the more modern practice.

Our choice of both the subject matter and the methods to be used in the education of the young will be determined further by our knowledge of their mental and physical nature and of its mode of growth. Now it has long been recognised that a knowledge of psychology is of value to the teacher, and this opinion finds expression in the very general inclusion of some study of psychology by those preparing to teach. Some parts of psychological doctrine are clearly likely to be of greater importance to those in charge of the young than other parts. Further, the help which psychological knowledge gives is sometimes misunderstood and claims made for it which experience fails to confirm. The teacher is concerned with individual cases, and psychological knowledge though it may be expected to enlighten our scholastic treatment, can hardly be looked to for prescription in detail of suitable modes of treatment. These considerations apply equally to the newer and to the older psychological knowledge. Hence it is not surprising that such a book as Green's "Psycho-analysis in the Class Room" says practically nothing about teaching procedure, and will cause disappointment to those who read it with any such hope.

Yet a knowledge of the structure, working and mode of growth of the mind is undoubtedly of value to the teacher, and the contribution to this knowledge made by psycho-analysis is likely to be as helpful in daily practice as recent advances in other branches of the subject have been. For instance, the more exact information now available of the variations in general and in specific ability to be found in a school population have already influenced school practice in various ways. We have then to inquire in what ways a knowledge of the theory and practice of psycho-analysis may be expected to influence the work of parents and teachers.

I do not propose, nor am I competent to give, an exposition here of psycho-analytic practice and theory. But it must be remarked that this knowledge is not so entirely new psychological knowledge, as some writers would seem to imply. It fits into the general framework of recognised psychological theory, though it may modify in some measure certain portions of that theory, as, for instance, the importance of mental conflict in determining mental activity and attitude. It is,

however, true that we now have a knowledge of certain forms of experience, the study of which was largely neglected by those psychologists who confined their attentions to the more ordinary forms of our experience. Professor Valentine's recent book is an attempt to show that the fundamental conceptions of psycho-analytic theory are identical with those of general psychology and that the mental processes studied are of the same nature as those hitherto analysed.

Psycho-analysis began as a method of treating mental disorders and the attempt to cure these naturally led to an attempt to understand them. The understanding reached as the result of studying abnormal cases may very well be expected to throw light on the normal working and growth of the mind. It is largely for this reason that the study is of value to teachers who in the main are concerned with children whose mental condition and growth are normal.

Though the influence of unconscious mental factors has long been recognised by psychologists yet the importance of these has been strikingly emphasised by the study of mental disorders and of dreams. "A fuller grasp of the essential character of the unconscious tendencies that are aroused (within the family circle) makes possible, and naturally leads up to, an important and far reaching readjustment of our views and our behaviour, and a readjustment that could scarcely be brought about by any other means." (Flugel—*Psycho-Analysis and the Family*, p. 217.)

Stout and Macdougall for instance have clearly shown the general operation of past experience and of innate mental structure in shaping our present experience. The conception of psychological dispositions would seem very closely to resemble that of the Unconscious. These dispositions may operate either through implicit or through explicit revival. If the operation is implicit we are not aware of it.

The influence of innate mental factors and of forgotten experience may be either good or bad. It is certainly not the case, as is apparently assumed by some writers, that the influence of those unconscious factors is always bad. It may, however, be so, and the explanation of unsatisfactory mental conditions in both adults and children may apparently sometimes be found in mental conflicts which have passed out of the field of conscious experience and memory. For instance, as Ian Hay points out, the soldiers' complaints may be quite baseless, but can be traced to the unexpressed and unacknowledged discomfort of badly fitting boots. So also a pupil's distaste for a subject may not be the result of his expressed in-

ability to master it, but rather of his unexpressed and perhaps forgotten dislike for the teacher who first taught him the subject. If he can be made aware of the real cause of his dislike it will probably disappear. The real motives which influence our behaviour are not necessarily the expressed motives and may even be unknown to us. The teacher should be made aware of such possibilities, and the knowledge will help towards his understanding and treatment of the children under his care.

Current educational theory and practice have shown a growing opposition to unnecessary and to unwise interference with the spontaneous impulses and desires of the young. Much interference formerly thought necessary is now held to be avoidable, and psycho-analytic evidence supports this opinion. The upbringing of the young inevitably requires some measure of interference with their natural inclinations, partly in their own interest and partly in that of their elders. The repression is unpleasant and tends to produce conflict in the child's mind in consequence either of the nature of the particular mind or of the way in which the repression has been applied. With some young people the conflict so produced may give rise, as has been shown by psycho-analytical evidence, to a morbid condition operative long after the conflict has passed from mind. We cannot, however, as some writers would seem to suggest, refrain from all interference and give free play to every desire and impulse. Further, it is hardly likely to be the case that even unwise interference and repression will always result in the production of a later morbid condition. But teachers and parents may well bear in mind the possible bad effects of repression exercised in early years. Burt, for instance, suggests that the present attitude of labour towards authority—the frequency of strikes and the mental attitude which finds expression in strikes may be the effect of mental conflict produced by undue parental repression. Perhaps still more, we may add, of the undue repression that was so frequent in the large classes of the elementary schools, taught by poorly trained or even fatigued teachers. (Cf. Flugel—*The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family*, p. 120.)

The repression of such innate tendencies as the gregarious instinct, and the instinct of self assertion may, it has been suggested, lead to day dreaming, which provides for them the satisfaction denied by the circumstances under which the child is living. We cannot, however, conclude that these tendencies should never be checked nor that day dreaming is never beneficial. On the other hand it is desirable that the teacher and parent should be aware of the harm that may

result from an unsuitable social environment and of the possible causes of unsatisfactory mental states. The provision of healthy conditions of mental growth is as necessary as the provision of healthy conditions of bodily growth. Many of the slips, accidents and omissions which mark the work of school children are apparently often symptomatic of mental conflicts of which the pupil is seldom clearly aware. They are likely to disappear when the conflict producing them has been discovered and brought to the notice of the pupil. Stammering, blushing, and shyness are said to be due likewise to unconscious mental conflict and the remedy is to be sought in its discovery and removal.

Thus it certainly seems that the educator should possess a knowledge of the persistent influence of past experience or present modes of thought, and particularly of the influence which mental conflicts in the past or in the present exercise in producing behaviour of an unusual or of a morbid character.

On another point a few remarks must be made. When we leave the broad general principles of psycho-analytic theory which I have indicated, there is found considerable divergence of opinion as to the interpretation of the data brought to light by psycho-analytic investigation. In the opinion of some the conflict which produces the morbid mental condition is always a conflict arising from the repression of or interference with the sex impulse during the years of infancy. This would seem on general grounds to be unlikely. Repression and interference may affect any natural tendency, impulse or desire, and the resulting mental conflict may produce a later morbid condition.

Again the morbid condition need not, it would seem, necessarily be the expression of a conflict due to infantile repression. It may be the expression of a recent conflict of which the subject may be partly or wholly unaware. At all events, he does not consciously recognise the real cause of his behaviour.

Again the dream is not apparently always the expression of an unfulfilled wish as seems to be the view of Freud; but is often to be interpreted as the expression of a mental conflict—long standing or recent.\* So, too, with respect to the morbid condition which finds expression in fears and anxieties of various kinds. The cause is not always the persistent after effect of the infantile conflicts. In dreams again, though

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\*Cf. Rivers—Conflict and Dreams.  
Lovell—Dreams.

the mental attitude is often infantile, it need not be so; and the material used would seem to be even less frequently infantile.

I conclude this brief account with some remarks on the question of treatment. The teacher should, it has been suggested, be acquainted with the psychological knowledge which psycho-analytic practice has made available. But he should not practice psycho-analysis himself. For the teacher does not, as a rule, possess the necessary training. On this there seems general though not entire agreement. Normal children are hardly likely to benefit by a form of treatment designed to cure mental disorders; on the other hand those children who exhibit signs of marked mental disorder should be referred for examination and treatment to the specialist in mental disease. Yet the teacher who is aware of the possible causes of mental disorder may by less formal methods deal with the milder cases that come under his notice in the course of his daily work. His daily intercourse with his pupils provides the opportunity for gaining a considerable knowledge of them as individuals and this knowledge often enables him to deal with difficulties and disabilities which they experience.

The teacher in order to conduct his work successfully must know his pupils. This knowledge will be both general and individual. His general psychological knowledge will tend to make his observations of individuals more full and accurate since he knows what to look for. Having become aware of the symptoms, the best treatment will often be indirect through a modification of the conditions affecting the pupil.



# FREUD AND RIVERS: A NOTE ON DREAM INTERPRETATION.

By

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**B**OTH Psychology and Anthropology suffered a great loss in the sudden death last year of Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, Fellow and Lecturer of St. John's College, Cambridge. After finishing his medical course, Rivers became interested in Experimental Psychology, and later on in Anthropology, making many original contributions to both subjects. As a result of the war, his attention turned to psycho-analysis. Here his investigations came to centre round the problem of the biological significance of the psycho-neuroses; and his book on *Instinct and The Unconscious*, is a highly suggestive treatment of this problem. At the time of his death, he was engaged on a work on dreams, which is now published, along with another volume on Psychology and Politics.\*

In both of these books we have striking proof of the remarkable versatility as well as elasticity of mind which characterised their author. "Psychology and Politics" consists mainly of the three interesting lectures on psychological theory which were delivered by Dr. Rivers on the occasion of his standing as candidate for the representation of the University of London in the House of Commons. "Surely," as Professor Elliott Smith says, "the most remarkable form of appeal to parliamentary electors in the history of politics." The lectures are thoroughly characteristic of Dr. Rivers and his aims, and will be read with interest by all who remember him.

When we turn to the second and more important book, "Conflict and Dream," the situation is somewhat different. Dr. Rivers possessed and retained to the end of his life a remarkable openness and plasticity of mind, which made him always ready to receive fresh ideas and to try them out in the light of experience. His university work brought him into close contact with the younger generation, whose affection and respect he never failed to win, and few men have done more than he to arouse the interest of students in the recent findings of psychological medicine, and especially in what he believed to be valuable in the work of Freud. It is more to be regretted that "Conflict and Dream" has been published of necessity without the revision and alteration which we are told he intended to give it. What form such alteration would have taken it is, of course, impossible to say, but it is not im-

\*Psychology and Politics, by H. R. Rivers, LL.D., F.R.S., etc. Conflict and Dream, by the same author. (12/6 each.) Kegan Paul, New York, 1923.

possible that further observation and reflection might have led him to modify some of the adverse criticism of the views of Professor Freud, which is prominent in this book. Many of the points raised I have not the space to deal with, but it may be useful to consider from this point of view two of Dr. Rivers' principal divergences from the doctrines of Freud.

Dr. Rivers wished to show that dreams spring mainly from present conflicts in the mind of the dreamer, and represent the solution, or attempted solution of such conflicts; and he has collected material to show that his own dreams and those of his patients were strikingly influenced by such conflicts. On this ground, among others, he dissents from the view of Freud that dreams are the fulfilment of unconscious wishes, and, as a rule, of infantile wishes. The question in dispute, however, cannot be settled in this manner. It is a point of theoretical importance upon which Freud has already expressed himself explicitly. According to Freud there is no form of affectively stressed mental process which may not resist the general lowering or activity which accompanies sleep, and thus carry over from the previous day into our dreams. "In correspondence," he says, "with the manifoldness of the conscious and pre-conscious processes of waking thought the remnants of the previous day's activity (which enter into our dreams) have the most multifarious and heterogeneous meanings; they may be undisposed of wishes or fears, they may be purposes, deliberations, warnings, attempts at adjustment to tasks which lie before us, etc. But these remnants from the previous day are not yet the dream. . . . Strictly taken, they are but the psychic material for dream production like any bodily or sense stimulations which may by chance be present. . . . So far as we have seen into the matter, we must say, the essential factor is an unconscious wish, as a rule infantile and now repressed, which is capable of reaching expression in this material and therefore lends it the energy (to come before consciousness during sleep). The fulfilment of *this* unconscious wish is the dream, whatever else it may contain in the way of warning, deliberation, confession, or anything else out of the rich content of preconscious waking life, which, remaining undisposed of (unerledigt) during the day, stretches forward into the night." (Abridged citation from *Ein Traum als Beweismittel*, Intern. Zeitschr. f. arztl. Psycho-analyse, 1913. Republished in *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften*, vierte folge, 1918.) It will be seen that Professor Freud's view includes the facts of which Dr. Rivers makes use, while at the same time he insists upon what he believes to be a further and essential fact which does not appear in Dr. Rivers' account. Any question as to the exis-

tence and significance of this latter fact can only be decided by evidence, and, naturally, by evidence based in the first instance upon the strict application of Professor Freud's method of investigation, which cannot fairly be disposed of *a priori*.

A similar remark might be made in regard to another point of view which is put forward prominently in Dr. Rivers' book. Dr. Rivers was inclined to hold that the peculiar and often grotesque forms assumed by our dream thinking were largely if not entirely due to the regression towards infantile modes of thought which takes place in sleep, and that Freud's concept of a "censorship" unconsciously exerted by the dreamer's social and other ideal interests over the manifest content of his dreams was thereby rendered unnecessary. The first part of this statement contains an undoubted truth. The infantile quality of many of our dreams is so obvious that it was noticed and commented on long before the investigations of Freud. Thus we find Dryden quoted in Freud's *Traumdeutung*:

"The nurse's legends are for truth received,  
And the man dreams but what the boy believed."

But this fact is far from disposing of the necessity for assuming a censorship, which maintains its sway, though much less strictly, over the content of our sleeping as of our waking thinking. Apart from all the other facts which independently support this conception, the question arises in regard to certain dreams, why does the dreamer fall back at certain points upon obscure symbolic thinking in surprising contrast to the rest of his dream, and why do such points turn out to deal with interests, which, however natural they may be, are as a matter of fact repugnant to the moral or aesthetic interests of the dreamer? Here again, the facts adduced by Dr. Rivers are not disputed, but it is suggested that the situation in sleep is somewhat more complicated than he supposed.

I have ventured to make these remarks because they touch upon important points in dream, and indeed in waking psychology, any misunderstanding about which would, as I think, be regrettable. But any criticism of this book must be made under the reservations previously mentioned which the circumstances of its publication dictate, and while it may be doubtful whether the book in its actual form can be said to have added much to our knowledge of dreams, yet we may hope that the attraction of its author's style, the freshness of his mode of expression, and the facts which it describes, may influence many readers to turn their attention to a most important aspect of our mental life, which until recently was too much neglected.

# PLATO'S "LAWS" AND MODERN LEGISLATION.

By

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**I**T may seem a bold thing to claim that Plato has any lessons for present-day democracy, or that his political philosophy has any application to the complex problems of the highly developed modern State. If Plato is known as a political philosopher at all, it is as the author of "The Republic," with its basis of communism, and its features of community of wives and philosopher kings. The interest of the Republic is not in its practical application to present-day problems, but in the fact that it seeks to solve practical problems by the application of the loftiest moral ideals. It emphasises the ethical basis of the State. It is remarkable, too, in this age of advanced socialistic ideas, as being the best example of the carrying out to their logical end of socialistic theories of universal State ownership and State control of the means of production, distribution and exchange. But Plato's Republic is doomed to remain for ever only an ideal, and must take its place with the other visionary perfect States which the idealists have created for us—the Heavenly Jerusalem of St. John, St. Augustine's City of God, the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, the New Atlantis of Bacon, and many others. These idealistic theories of the right form of government have, however, one practical function in common which no democracy can afford to ignore, that they bring prominently to our notice the importance of formulating the ultimate aim of the State. What, for example, is our legislative ideal in Australia? Is it anything more than the mere material object of securing for everyone a high standard of comfort and plenty of leisure to spend in enjoyment? The matters of practical legislation with the attainment of which the great political parties of Australia are concerned are almost entirely materialistic. Material interests hold the field of discussion; ethical considerations tend to be pushed into the background; and the people are taught to regard their wishes and their wants as the sole criteria of right and justice.

The Republic was written when Plato was a young man, and its theories are full of the hopefulness and enthusiasm of youth and of confidence in the goodness of man's moral nature and in the strength of an appeal made to his reason. Plato assumed that to know the right thing to do was necessarily

to do it, if it could be done. The error he fell into was in assuming that the typical citizen of his Republic was a man like-minded with himself. The history of his life shows that he was sadly disillusioned by practical experience of methods of government, and came to realise that by reason of the incurable weakness of human nature and especially of the failings of rulers, the basis of his ideal Republic would have to be rejected. He ultimately concluded that the system of government which was most likely to be successful in practice was one founded on the most desirable features of Constitutions which he found actually existing in the civilised world of his day, or which had existed at a sufficiently recent period to have their principles recorded in authentic history. The features selected as most desirable would be those principles and institutions which had proved most successful in actual operation. It was for the purpose of evolving a system of government by the application of the principle of comparative legislation that Plato wrote the *Laws*, and in order to understand fully the difference between the Republic and the *Laws* in the spirit and the method of treatment it is necessary to recall the outstanding incidents in Plato's own life in the sphere of practical politics and their probable effect upon his mental attitude towards political problems.

In 367 B.C. the elder Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse in Sicily, which was then at the height of its power and splendor, died, and was succeeded by his son, the younger Dionysius. Dion had been the trusted adviser and intimate friend of the elder Dionysius, and, like Bismarck in modern times, he continued in the same capacity with the son upon his accession. Dion was an ardent admirer and disciple of Plato, and he persuaded Dionysius to invite Plato to Syracuse to listen to his schemes for an ideal State. We can imagine what a golden opportunity Plato must have considered was presented to him when the invitation reached him. It must have seemed the very realisation of his dreams for an Ideal State, Absolute Power putting itself at the disposal of philosophy. The temptation to accept proved irresistible and Plato went to Syracuse. For a time all went well, and at one time Dionysius under the influence of Dion was actually prepared to transform his despotism at Syracuse into a limited monarchy subject to constitutional restraints. But the young man was far from being a model ruler. The dissoluteness of his life was especially offensive to Plato, for it offended against his theory that the first qualification for ruling others with a view to their ultimate perfection was that the ruler should first have made himself perfect. Plato apparently did not mince matters with the

young king, but bluntly told him that he was unworthy to govern until he had undergone a thorough purification. "First go through your schooling," he said, "and then do all these things; otherwise leave them undone." A little tact and worldly wisdom might have saved Dionysius from estrangement, but Plato was not the sort of man to compromise in a matter of principle, and he and the king were soon out of sympathy with each other. The experiment ended in disaster. Plato was effectively disillusioned of his dream of the reform of society by the co-operation of kings. He returned in disgust to Athens, and resumed his old life.

This episode, in so quiet a life as Plato's, must have profoundly modified the philosopher's political views, and he must have come to realise that the ideal State as described in the "Republic" was for ever unattainable. Many years afterwards, towards the end of his long life, he wrote the "Laws" with the object of describing a State which was more nearly perfect than any that then existed or had hitherto existed, but which was quite capable of realisation in practice by men and women of the ordinary everyday type. Solon had said that "he did not give the Athenians the best laws, but the best laws which the people would bear." On the same principle, Plato in the *Laws* gives, not the best State as enshrined in the *Republic*, but the best attainable State. Instead of philosophic kings and guardians, we must be content with a body of written laws administered by magistrates and juries. Instead of community of wives, we must fall back on the old-fashioned institution of marriage. Instead of a transcendental philosophy, we must keep the old gods of popular superstition and the established ritual of religion.

The scene of the "Laws" is laid in Crete, and the interlocutors in the dialogue are three, all old men—Megillus, a Spartan, Cleinias, a Cretan of Cnossus, and an Athenian stranger, who may be identified with Plato himself, and who is the leader of the discussion. The Cretan and the Spartan can hardly be said to contribute anything to the argument of which the Athenian is the expounder; they only supply information when asked about the institutions of their respective countries. The Cretans, it appears, have determined to found a colony on a deserted spot at one end of the island, and Cleinias has been appointed one of the ten commissioners to draw up laws for the new colony. Here is an interesting situation, and the Athenian proposes that the three shall discuss the topics it suggests in the course of a walk from Cnossus to the cave and temple of Zeus under Mount Ida and as the day is hot they can rest in the beautiful groves of cypresses and

green meadows which lie on their way. Megillus will supply any information as to the laws of Sparta, Cleinias as to the laws of Crete, and the Athenian stranger is ready to explain everything that is connected with Athens and its institutions. The institutions of Persia and Egypt are also incidentally referred to. Here, it may be noted, Plato is making use of the comparative method for devising the laws of the new Colony. The comparative method is the only safe method in legislation, and it is only in the last few years that it has begun to take its true place as a scientific study. There exists in England a very authoritative and learned society, The Society of Comparative Legislation, whose main function it is to publish periodically a *Journal of Comparative Legislation* devoted to the study of the legislation of other countries, and particularly to a review of the whole of the current legislation of the British Empire. It is a remarkable tribute to Plato's acuteness of mind that he was able to recognise the value of the comparative method. Plato's State was founded on institutions which he saw actually existed in Sparta, in Crete, and in Athens. The *syssitia* or public mess tables, the gymnastic training, the distribution of land, the status and disciplinary powers of the Ephors—these and other Doric customs form the ground plan of his design, but on this foundation he erects a superstructure drawn largely from the more liberal Athenian life with its art, its literary culture, and joy of living. He thus takes the best elements from each and assimilates them by means of his judgment and power of imagination into a harmonious structure. It is easy to see why Plato chose Sparta as his model. In spite of its defects—its prejudices and self-centred exclusiveness, its rigid military routine, its lack of art and literature, its boorish dislike of and inhospitality to strangers—Plato found in Sparta that discipline of life both public and private which was the condition of the ideal State and alone could form the true citizen. Plato's ideal city as described in the *Laws* is not a city of conquest or of power; it was neither Hygeiopolis nor Plutopolis: wealth was indeed to have the last place in Plato's State. "Material prosperity," he says. "if there is anything in the witness of history, can never be the basis of a really great community." Plato's ideal city was to be a city dedicated to virtue, or—because that word "virtue" is somewhat colorless and narrow—to the noble life. The whole mission of the State is to train men for this, and in the system in vogue in Sparta Plato found the right principle to be applied in the Ideal State. In Sparta the citizen was trained in absolute devotion to public duty—trained to endurance, hardihood, self-discipline; here, if anywhere, service to the State was accounted the highest kind of well-doing and

the greatest source of honor. The inscription on the grave of Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans in the Pass at Thermopylae—"Stranger, go tell the Lacedemonians that we died in obeying their commands"—breathes the true Spartan spirit. It was the habit of discipline which gave the Spartan Hoplite—the Greek Ironside—his character for invincibility, and inspired a confidence in him in the hour of danger which was felt in no other of the Greeks. The basis of this discipline was religion. The Lacedemonian was, as his name implies, pre-eminently "God-fearing." On this point—the ethical basis of the State—Plato leaves us in no doubt at all. Everything else is subordinated to it. Plato's central conception is the steady disciplining of life to the highest ends—"likeness to God." This ideal for community life was attempted to be put into practice by the early Christians and again in the case of the Monastic Orders of the Roman Catholic Church, with this difference, that whereas Plato intended his Code of Laws for the ordinary citizen carrying out his daily tasks as farmer or trader or merchant, the Early Christian and Monastic Codes were never claimed to be applicable to any but a select few who were willing to withdraw themselves wholly or partly from the ordinary duties of life. Plato's ideal may be likened to the "Kingdom of God" of the Gospels upon which Christian sociologists have based a theory of the State, and as an ideal to result from obedience to laws which Plato describes and which he derives largely from existing Constitutions it would be hard to find anything in the modern world to put beside it.

Plato's policy of State regulation and discipline for the purpose of developing the character of the individual citizen has obvious claims upon the consideration of law-makers and leaders of the people, but it tends to be totally lost sight of in modern democracies. The trend of modern democratic legislation, especially in Australia, is in the other direction, being adapted rather to remove difficulties from the path of the individual citizen and to make him as comfortable as possible rather than to strengthen his character. We have become familiar in Australia with a system of universal maternity allowance and universal old-age pensions and there is very little doubt that this principle of State-aid will be carried further in the years to come. Recently in New South Wales the Government proposed to spend £5,000,000 per annum on a system of State endowment of motherhood, under which the mother of a family would receive a fixed sum per week for every child after the second, and the embodiment in legislation of this scheme or some modification of it may ultimately

be expected to take place either in New South Wales or elsewhere in Australia. The outlook recalls the days of indiscriminate outdoor relief in England in the early 19th century, when the report of the Poor Law Commission showed that the system had sapped the habits of industry, and imperilled the family life of whole classes of the community. This tendency towards governmental maternalism, i.e., the coddling of the individual citizen, appears to be a characteristic of advanced democracies. According to one eminent and impartial observer "The bidding for support of whole classes of voters by legislation for their benefit presents probably the most serious menace to which British institutions are exposed." English legislation in the past has seldom erred on the side of maternalism. It has aimed rather at Plato's ideal of discipline and duty as a means for the development of character.

The occupations of Plato's citizens are to be agriculture and the pastoral life, and for this purpose the land of the city is to be parcelled out into 5,040 lots, corresponding to the number of citizens—each lot being of a size sufficient to maintain a family of sober habits—the equivalent of our "three acres and a cow." The lots distributed among the citizens are not to be alienable. Plato's object in this was evidently to prevent the state of things which had arisen in Sparta. There each citizen had originally one equal share, but as time went on inequalities arose, and in Plato's time there was no Greek State in which the contrast of poverty and riches was more striking than in Sparta. In this provision of Plato's we may note, by the way, the beginning of a principle which may now be found widely adopted in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, under the name of the Homestead Acts—the principle that a man's homestead shall not be broken up, that it shall be sacred even from the claims of creditors.

In Athens of Plato's day women lived in a state of semi-oriental seclusion and took no part in public life. Plato decided that such a system was not good, and that women, however reluctantly, must be drawn into the common life of the State, if ever they are to be imbued with its spirit and become partners in its work. They must therefore have their meals in public with the men, at common tables; this is at once a means for releasing women from household cares for public life, and a form of public life in itself. They must also share the same training as men; and a single system of compulsory education must include both sexes alike. Women, like men, must be trained in gymnastics, for in Sparta the girls shared the sports of the men, and to this physical training they owed their fine shape and fresh complexions. The prim mid-Vic-

torian maid would not have appealed to Plato. It is remarkable that it is only within the last fifty years that these liberal views with regard to women have been generally adopted in highly-civilised communities.

But it is to the training of the young that Plato looks mainly for the success of his Model City. Plato agreed with the sentiment of Bishop Hall—"All our evils in Church and State have sprung from this—a too great neglect of children." The welfare of the child is the centre of his teaching and it is remarkable that only in the present century have civilised nations realised the importance of the training of the child and of providing for children the best possible environment in which to grow up. The present age is the age of the child in legislation, as the latter half of last century was the age of the woman. Civilised nations everywhere are concentrating upon the child as embodying the hope of the race, legislating for its welfare, bodily and mental, in every sort of way, protecting its helplessness from ill-usage, rescuing it from bad associations, providing free meals for the hungry, training its intelligence by object-lessons, if it does wrong trying it in a special Children's Court, and if it is convicted, imprisoning it in a special reformatory prison to save it from the contamination of the common criminal. In designing his scheme of education, Plato draws freely from what he found existing at Athens, but he moulds the existing system to his ideal ends. The child is to be taught to love the best. Education is not—as with us—a mere intellectual process, getting up so many "subjects" for examination, but a moral training comprehending the whole life. It must begin at the earliest possible moment—even before birth. When only three to four years of age, the little ones are to be taken by their nurses to play near the temples, so that they may learn religious awe. The very play of the child is to be utilised. Here we have an anticipation of the "Kindergarten." The young are to be brought up in happy surroundings out of the way of sights and sounds which may hurt the character or vitiate the taste. They are to live in an atmosphere of health. The breeze is always to be wafting to them the impression of truth and goodness. For this ideal we to-day look mainly to the home life. But the sentiments current among us as to "lessons learnt at a mother's knee," or "the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world," would not have appealed to Plato. The woman he held to be a "bad educator," and probably he was quite right so far as the Athenian mother was concerned, living as she did in a condition of semi-oriental seclusion. Nothing in the "Laws" is more striking, or perhaps more valuable, than Plato's advo-

cacy of the organised school and his belief in compulsory education.

Space will not permit of a more detailed description of the institutions as sketched by Plato in the *Laws*. There remains the question already touched on incidentally, of the practical value of the "*Laws*" to Australian legislators and leaders of the people, reading the "*Laws*" in the spirit and not in the letter.

The first lesson to be learnt is the value of a legislative ideal in politics. Where there is no vision, it has been said, the people perish. Lord Bryce's comment on this aspect of Australian politics is that "Parliamentary debates do little to instruct or guide the people, nor do the legislative bodies inspire respect. There is singularly little idealism in politics." What, then, ought this political ideal to be? Certainly it does not involve the distribution to the electors of doles or largesses, either in money or in kind. Plato would never have approved of the policy of such legislation as the Maternity Allowances Act. Indeed, there would appear to be little which remains to be done in the form of direct legislation. The average Australian, as a result of ameliorative legislation, is now probably as well off from the material point of view as Parliament can possibly make him. A relatively high standard of wages is secured to him by Factories Acts and Industrial Courts, and by the same means he is safeguarded against being "sweated" by grasping employers, and against the risk of injury to his health or bodily welfare by insanitary conditions or dangerous machinery. In most of the Australian States loans may be made to persons of small means which will enable them to secure homes for themselves upon easy terms. Legislative development in the future cannot go much further upon the same lines, for there is not much further to go. Is it not time that legislators turned from the task of making the elector comfortable to the higher task of making him happy? To this end the elector should be taught, in Plato's phrase, to "love the best." The pleasures of good books, of music and paintings, above all of the open air and the varied sights and sounds of nature, can be made of universal appeal. On the other hand, wrong-doing, especially offences against family life, might, by a better system of criminal justice, be visited with punishment more quickly and more certainly than under the existing system. Above all, legislators may do a great deal by example and precept, where at present they do practically nothing at all. Who ever heard of an Australian legislator condemning the present craze for gambling on horse-races, for viewing the moving pictures, in

fact, for all forms of hectic pleasure? Legislators should, both inside and outside Parliament, tell the people boldly that the existing legislation for their material benefit cannot be substantially improved upon, and that the elector's real well-being depends on moral and spiritual factors over which he alone has control. The State can and will assist him by providing him with suitable environment and opportunities for appreciating what is best, but his happiness depends on the degree in which he himself translates the means provided by the State into moral and spiritual well-being.

The second practical lesson for Australians is the futility of trusting entirely to legislation to ensure the material and moral welfare of the individual citizen, as if the *form* of government were all-important. Plato may or may not have exclaimed when Dionysius failed him at Syracuse, "Put not your trust in princes;" he certainly does say in effect in "The Laws," and it is the whole theme of the dialogue, "Put not your trust in Parliaments." In the Republic Plato assumes that the regeneration of society involved merely the discovery of the most perfect form of government, and that, when once the most perfect form of government was discovered the community which adopted it must necessarily be the happiest and have the best citizens. In "The Laws," on the other hand, the basis of Plato's argument is that the proper work of Parliament is to provide the political institutions and other means which have proved in actual practice best calculated to enable individuals in other communities to develop their own character and thereby become good citizens, and not to fall into the error of legislating for the citizen as if he were always a child and needed all his life to be subject to multitudinous and minute regulations administered by a numerous body of State officials. Plato realised that the State's proper function is to assist the citizen to form his own character, not to act as if the State could do his work for him and hand him over a character ready formed. The contrast needs to be emphasised because of the hold that Socialism, defined as "the control by the State of the means of production, distribution and exchange," has on many members of one of the great political parties in Australia. What is substantially involved in the realisation of this ideal is vividly presented in Mr. Edward Bellamy's novel, "Looking Backward." The success of the scheme there sketched depends, as Plato's Ideal Republic depended, on an elaborate and detailed regulation of the daily life of the citizen by the State, the administration of this complex system being carried out by an army of officials, who, in the theory of both these idealistic philosophers, were wise, paternal, dis-

interested, and in short thoroughly qualified to save the individual citizen from the irksome task of thinking and acting for himself. Plato in "The Laws" finally rejects the exaggerated estimate of human disinterestedness and integrity upon which the Republic was founded. His experience of practical politics at Syracuse had taught him the fallibility of rulers, and had he lived at the present day and seen in every community the influence exercised by cliques, caucuses and camarillas, by the power of wealth and the power of birth, he would find no reason to change his opinion. He would reject Mr. Bellamy's alluring picture of the Socialistic State in operation for the same reason as he rejected the basis of the Republic, for the reason that the success of both depended on the capacity of officials elected by a popular vote, and Plato could have no doubt that under such a system the man with the glib tongue and the persuasive manner, the lavish promiser, the scheming organiser, would get all the power and profit, while patient merit went to the wall. Socialism never has worked, and is never likely to work in practice, because it is a form of government which demands a very much higher public spirit and far greater altruism in the average citizen in a community than has ever been realised at any time in any country with whose authentic history we are acquainted.

The third practical lesson to be learnt from the "Laws" is the value of the study of the legislative experiments of other countries and their economic and political results. All the civilised nations of the world are busily engaged under different conditions, and by different methods, in pursuing objects which are similar and often identical. We are all attempting with imperfect vision and with stumbling steps to advance, as far as we can, by legislation and administration, the cause of humanity and civilisation, to make our laws more intelligible and more rational, to make better provision for those who are unable to help themselves. We have all much to learn from each other, from our experiments, from our failures, from our successes. But in Australia we tend to ignore the lessons of experience, and think we are making our legislative experiments in a watertight compartment. Great practical problems, such as the White Australia policy, and Industrial Arbitration and Protection, are viewed as though they affected only Australia, and only the present generation of Australians. No attempt is made to search the records of history to discover whether similar legislative policies have, in other countries, and under substantially similar conditions, been put in operation in the past, and, if so, what their fate has been. The immense complexity of the problems

involved is not realised, and there is little desire to learn what has been tried or is being tried in Europe or elsewhere. Thus the average Australian is apt to welcome as an entirely new idea the theory of financing the State by the issue of a vast amount of paper money "secured on the great natural resources of the country" without knowing or caring anything of the history of the system of "assignats" by which the Revolutionary Government of France tried to raise money in the days of the French Revolution. So also when Communistic Socialism is recommended, few think of the fate of Lane's New Australia, the settlement in Paraguay. The Australian is proud to think that his legislation is the most advanced in the world, and he would be surprised to hear that he may learn something by studying the institution and laws of older countries. He does not pause to reflect that the race problems, industrial problems, and economic problems of Australia are essentially the same as similar problems in certain other countries, and that he can learn something by studying the legislative experiments of such countries. The fact is that the Australian is apt to look at a legislative proposal solely as it affects himself, and unless its beneficial results are likely to make themselves felt early or at least in his lifetime it is not likely to receive his approval.

To such an attitude of mind the study of the Constitutions and history of the free City States of ancient Greece is a valuable corrective. The political and social conditions were undoubtedly very different from those of modern times, but the tendencies of human nature in those far-off times did not differ from the tendencies of human nature to-day. Man has gained in the course of over 2000 years a great number of material ameliorations of his lot, but he is no wiser or more moral or more capable of mental or physical achievements or more free from human frailties than he was in the days of the Athenian Republic. As the problems of good government were essentially the same, so were the motives and the temptations. The working of the various institutions of government and their effect on the people, the tendencies of democracies and their characteristics, are as discernable in the case of the democracies of ancient Greece, as with those we live in to-day.

# DEMOCRACY AND STATESMANSHIP.

By

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**I**N all human societies there is an unvarying tendency to regard the political conditions prevailing at any particular time as fixed and immutable. Gradual changes, like those of a physical kind produced by the operation of natural laws, pass unnoticed; only such political cataclysms as the sudden transition of ancient Rome from republican to despotic government, and, in recent times, the French and the Russian revolution attract general attention. For reasons that need not now be considered imperative, immobility long characterized ancient despotisms, such as those of Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, etc. Yet we know that political institutions in all modern civilized countries are in a state of continual movement, responding to the varying impulses of popular sentiment, and the necessities of the times. The magnitude of the changes referred to can only be realized when we compare the present political condition of any country with its present condition, say, fifty years ago. Take the case of Great Britain. At the beginning of the present century the triple partnership in the sphere of government of King, Lords and Commons was in active operation. It is true, of course, that the House of Commons was then, and had long been, the predominant partner; but its decisions were inoperative unless ratified by the Sister Chamber and could always be negatived by the exercise of the Royal prerogative. By the passage of the Parliament Act in 1910, however, the old constitutional equipoise was destroyed. The veto of the House of Lords is now merely suspensive, while that of the Sovereign, though not formally abolished, has fallen into complete desuetude. What is still ironically called the "Lower" Chamber has become supreme in Great Britain, and the complete fulfilment of the mournful prediction of the younger Pitt seems to be rapidly approaching. Within recent years a further change has been in progress. The chief authority in the State has tended more and more to become concentrated in a few hands, and the power of the British Cabinet has steadily increased. Both democracy and despotism favour centralised authority. Long ago that shrewd political philosopher, Hobbes, defined liberty as "power cut into fragments." Those fragments even in normal times, are subject to strong centripetal influences. In days of political convulsion the strength of those influences becomes overwhelming. The French Revolution gave birth successively to the National Assembly, the Committee of Public

Safety, the Directory and the Napoleonic Empire. The Russian Revolution has so far produced the Central Soviet, the Extraordinary Commission, and a supreme Council dominated by a triumvirate of able and unscrupulous men. The military dictator is likely soon to follow and restore the old autocracy in a more active and ruthless form. The particles of power dispersed abroad by the volcanic forces of revolution, by the operation of the law of political attraction invariably in the end, reassemble and coalesce to form the iron rod of despotism.

The people of Australia, fortunately, have so far escaped those social convulsions by which most of the older communities have periodically been torn asunder. This happy immunity may be ascribed partly to geographical isolation and racial homogeneity, partly to freedom from those intolerable hardships which the masses of the people have to bear in densely populated countries, partly to the absence so far of embittered class or religious feuds, and largely to inherent qualities of mind and character. Common sense and a spirit of fair-play, the characteristics of all British communities, are the most effective safeguards against civil strife. And there is necessarily less friction among a small number of people inhabiting a large country than among a large number inhabiting a small one. Where Nature offers abundance for all, the struggle to obtain possession of her gifts cannot reach a dangerous degree of intensity. But, as time goes on, all the advantages hitherto enjoyed by the people of the Commonwealth, save, we may hope, one alone, will gradually weaken and disappear. Class rivalries and jealousies will develop with the growth of population and the intensifying of the struggle for existence. The menace of foreign attack will strengthen with the expansion of the power of the Asiatic nations and the annihilation of distance by the development of aeronautics. And it may well be that in the circumstances which will exist before the close of the present century the political institutions which Australia has found fairly satisfactory in her early youth will, if not essentially modified, prove the source of weakness, discord and peril. Of the abstract merits of different forms of government it were futile to argue. It is a mere truism that, in practice, political institutions suited to a nation that has attained a high degree of civilization would be entirely unsuited to another whose condition was less advanced. National psychology in the main determines the form of national government, and changes to be beneficial, must come from within not without. Many observers regard with some trepidation the political experiments now being attempted in such countries as India, China and

Egypt, where already the effects of pouring new wine into old bottles are proving disruptive. After all, seeing that the perfect government connotes the perfect society, perfection in theory where the condition essential to success is absent, may lead to unfortunate results in practice. Statecraft is not an exact science. It is essentially practical. The control of the affairs of mankind could not safely be entrusted either to idealists or professors of mathematics.

Each of the three recognised forms of government, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, has certain salient characteristics. Blackstone, in the introduction to his famous Commentaries attributed to the first that of strength, to the second that of wisdom, and to the third that of honesty of purpose. Like all generalisations the saying is open to criticism, inasmuch as, under a weak monarch, such as Honorius or Henry VI, a country either falls into a state of Anarchy, or becomes the victim of some resolute foreign enemy, while in times of revolutionary excitement the democratic government puts forth the super-human, though usually transient, energy of madness. And aristocracy, using the term in its customary debased and incorrect sense as implying government by a privileged class may, as has again and again been proved in history, be both weak and foolish. The British Constitution as it existed during the early portion of the last century combined, perhaps, in the highest degree yet attained in modern times, the three great essentials of good government, strength, wisdom and virtue.

Supporters of representative institutions may be divided into two classes corresponding roughly to the optimates and populares of Cicero's time. Those belonging to the one regard the franchise as a privilege. Those belonging to the other consider it a right. The former hold that citizens should be raised to the franchise; the latter favour the lowering of the franchise to the great mass of citizens. The one school emphasizes the right of every citizen to good government, and contends, not unreasonably, that good government is impossible unless the functions of legislation and administration be confined only to honest and capable hands. The other, ignoring the vital question as to whether real merit, or hypocrisy, or plausible incompetence is most likely to win the favour of uninformed electors, insists that, with negligible exceptions, every adult citizen possesses an inherent and equal right to assist, directly or indirectly, in making the laws which he is required to obey. Thinkers of the one class place the common weal above the common will, while the views of their opponents were fairly expressed by a late Prime Minister of Great Britain,

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, when he roundly asserted that good government was no substitute for government by the people. The attitude of the champion of the one school is governed mainly by intellectual and practical, that of the other by moral and theoretical considerations; and while the former rely on history and the recognized disparities and the limitations of human mind and character to justify their views, the latter profess profound faith in popular instincts, and appeal to general principles of equality and justice.

It is an extraordinary fact, and one which shows the overwhelming force of human vanity, that a form of government which has never received the unqualified commendation of a single political thinker of eminence is now commonly regarded as quite superior to criticism. Ephemeral administrators supported by ephemeral Parliamentary majorities elected in an atmosphere of turbulence and misrepresentation by huge masses of politically ignorant electors, are complacently recognized as the fitting instruments to give effect to what is commonly called the national will. We do not, certainly, choose our legislators in the rather crude fashion adopted by the citizens of an ancient Greek State, where from time to time the candidates for positions of authority were required to pass in succession, accompanied by their supporters, closed chambers in which certain appointed judges were concealed, and those in whose favour it was considered the loudest uproar was raised were declared elected. The vox populi now operates in a less noisy and disturbing fashion, and we have substituted election by votes for election by clamour. Yet can we affirm with confidence that the ballot ensures the supremacy of brain power over lung power? And if we accept as true the quaint saying of Plutarch contained among Bacon's Apophthegms: "It is otherwise in a commonwealth of men than of bees; the hive of a city or kingdom is in best condition when there is least of noise or buzz in it," a system under which communities are agitated at short intervals by the disturbances known as general elections, in order, not infrequently, that bad legislators may be replaced by worse, has little claim to the respect either of the political philosopher or the average intelligent citizen.

While representative government based on universal suffrage, and subject to none but the most derisory safeguards, has always been the object of censure and ridicule among notable political thinkers, its defenders have mainly been confined to members of the particular class unquestionably benefited by it. Popular politicians are unanimous in acclaiming what they usually call popular institutions. Their attitude is quite natural, but it can hardly be said to be dictated by

motives altogether free from self-interest. Against the innumerable adulatory tributes to Demos we now hear from platforms and pulpits may be placed the considered opinions of many great thinkers on political questions, "I see as little of policy or utility as there is of right in laying down a principle that a majority of men, told by the head, are to be considered as the people, and that as such their will is to be law," wrote Burke in his "First Principles of Politics." In the last chapter of his famous "History of Europe" Alison compared the respective merits of democratic and aristocratic government in a manner by no means favourable to the former. Coleridge denounced the first Reform Act as a "mad and barbarising scheme," and Carlyle's opinion as to the wisdom of extending the franchise in Great Britain yet further was forcibly expressed in his well-known essay, "Shooting Niagara." "Tyranny," wrote Dr. Mommsen in his masterpiece, "is everywhere the result of universal suffrage," and Swift emphatically declared: "Law in a free country is, or ought to be, the determination of those who have property in land," a principle adopted in the ancient Italian republics. That keen student of democratic developments in the United States of America during the early portion of last century, De Tocqueville, in a work which is a recognized classic, condemned in the strongest terms the tyranny exercised there by popular majorities. Even the Radical John Stuart Mill in his "Representative Government" laid down that "equal voting is in principle wrong," and advocated a system of plural voting as a check on the predominance of ignorance and cupidity. In the same work, also, he referred to "that falsely-called democracy which is really the exclusive rule of the operative classes." The political views of Napoleon, himself the child and champion of a revolution whose watch-words were "Liberty, equality and fraternity," were crystallised in the aphorism: "Everything for the people; nothing by them." Herbert Spencer, in his "Study of Sociology," wrote "new democracy is but old despotism differently spelt." Milton, Gibbon, Ruskin, Lecky, and numerous other great thinkers of modern as well as ancient times, while differing widely on many social and political questions, agreed in condemning government by the mob vote. Referring to the economic questions involved, Grattan, in the days when Southern Ireland was ruled by statesmen rather than gunmen, said: "If you transfer the power in the State to those who have nothing in the country they will afterwards transfer the property." The prediction has been completely fulfilled in Russia lately, with staggering results, and is in course of fulfilment in the orator's native country. A modern essayist, Mr. W. S. Lilly, in an article that appeared in the

"Nineteenth Century" in March, 1910, expressed a view very common in educated circles when he wrote: "To determine grave questions in the public order by counting heads is absurd. You might as well determine them by measuring stomachs." Finally, every student of politics is familiar with the grave words addressed by Socrates to his judges at one of the most memorable trials in history: "Let not the truth offend you; it is no peculiarity of your democracy or of your national character; but wherever the people is sovereign, no man who shall dare honestly to oppose injustice, frequent and extravagant injustice, can avoid destruction."

So much for the opinions of men of established fame. Many more of a similar kind might be quoted. Let us summarize now the charges brought against representative government, based on universal suffrage, by its many assailants. It is affirmed, firstly, that such government is not free, but, as Mill contended, class government, and, moreover, of all kinds of class government the worst of all, inasmuch as the class endowed by virtue of numbers with supreme power must, through ignorance and lack of average capacity, be the least fitted of all to govern; that the enfranchisement of the unfit must, in practice, entail the disfranchisement of the fit, seeing that in all societies the latter are necessarily in a small minority; that democratic assemblies are invariably inclined to do what is popular rather than what is wise, and that, owing to the absence of a sufficient number of really capable men in such bodies, popular government combines the maximum of friction, instability and waste with the minimum of prudence, security and efficiency. An electoral system under which the gaol-bird possesses as much political power as the judge, and the vote of the drunken and illiterate tramp is treated as equal to that of the learned professor or able business manager, is open to derision. Popular elections, the opponents of ultra-democratic institutions affirm, favour craft rather than honesty, ignorant self-assertiveness rather than modest merit, volubility rather than wisdom and real capacity. Continuity of policy they declare to be impossible under a system of frequent elections, which frequently mean that as soon as a man has gained a little experience as a legislator he is peremptorily dismissed. How, they ask, can the ship of state be successfully navigated when the course determined to-day may be reversed to-morrow, and the captain may at any time, at the bidding of the crew, be superseded by the cabin boy? They emphasize the fact that extreme democracy invariably breeds corruption, and corruption of the worst kind, seeing that it is disguised and indirect rather than open. Candidates of an

unscrupulous type at popular elections, it is pointed out, do not—for sufficient reasons—buy votes at their own expense. They buy them at the expense of others by promising to support predatory class legislation. Sociologists unsparingly condemn the demoralising effects of much of the so-called “humanitarian” legislation to which popularly-elected Chambers are addicted, and the evils of bureaucracy which invariably attend the growth of State paternalism. Historical examples are cited to show the folly and danger of encouraging large masses of people not to live for the State but on it, to the detriment of the essential qualities of self-reliance and patriotism. Lastly, it is affirmed, a people subject to an ultra-democratic regime almost invariably loses all respect for the ephemeral legislators who gratify its whims and seek to win its favour by flattery and deception, and that contempt for the law-maker necessarily means contempt for the law. Save in moments of national frenzy or dire peril, democratic government is marked by the crowning defects of irresolution and weakness.

The charges brought against unrestrained democracy have been briefly summarised because the Australian Federal Constitution is the most democratic instrument of its kind in the world. It provides for two Chambers, both elected by universal suffrage. Only the most derisory qualifications are required in the case of electors and candidates. Any citizen of either sex not under the age of 21 years and of British nationality, who is sane enough to keep out of a lunatic asylum and moral enough to keep out of gaol, may be entrusted with the task of making laws for the inhabitants of a whole continent. Seeing that identity of franchise must mean identity of political opinion, neither Chamber operates as a real check on the other. In consequence, though bicameral in form, the Federal Legislature is unicameral in reality; and the Senate (for which, incongruously enough, youths of 21 are eligible) is not a Chamber of revision but a Chamber of affirmation. The decisions of these two bodies are final, provided, of course, they do not infringe those State rights which are rather inadequately protected by the Constitution. The Crown, indeed, in theory, retains the right of veto, but actually the exercise of that right has fallen into abeyance. Since, too, no Australian Constitution, either State or Federal, allows the impeachment of political offenders, an unscrupulous Government supported by a servile or venal majority might conceivably carry out a policy ruinous to the abiding interests of the country (such, for instance, as the enforcement of a levy on capital, or the wholesale issue of paper money), without

fear of any worse punishment than expulsion from office. The incendiaries would merely be deprived of their torches after setting fire to the house. Responsible government in Australia may therefore be correctly described as government without responsibility. Those safeguards against the designs of unscrupulous ambition and the dangers of reckless innovation which, as in the well-known Law of Zaleucus, sometimes took an extreme form in the constitutions of ancient republics, and which are characteristic of most modern democratic constitutions, are absent from that which created the Australian Commonwealth. When we reflect that, judged by their results, the crimes of the greatest magnitude recorded in history were those committed by politicians, it seems neither just nor expedient that the latter should be treated as privileged offenders.

Particular reference has been made to what the present writer humbly submits are grave defects in the Australian Federal Constitution, in order that the vital necessity of taking every possible precaution, that the men entrusted by the electors with almost uncontrolled authority over their affairs shall be fit for their responsible positions may be fully realised. Australia is a young country, and young countries can withstand maladies which often prove fatal to the old. And because the Commonwealth, protected from outside perils by the "sure shield" of the British Navy, has hitherto succeeded in wobbling along unsteadily, but without suffering any severe fall, it does not follow that, when conditions have completely changed, as they must do in course of time, and the path becomes rough and dangerous, the risk of meeting with a possibly fatal accident will remain negligible. Symptoms of approaching danger, both external and internal, are already clearly visible to the eye of the political student; but these matters lie outside the scope of the present paper. It is enough to remark that unrestrained democracy, or ochlocracy, is a disease that has destroyed, or grievously weakened, many nations in the past. Our aim should be progress, but progress with prudence. And prudence which, in politics at least, deserves Burke's commendation as the first of virtues, has not always been a distinguishing feature of the legislation of popular assemblies.

It will surely be granted, even by the most uncompromising upholder of democratic institutions, that special qualifications, both moral and intellectual, are needed for the successful discharge of legislative functions. Special knowledge, also, counts for something. The man who can make good boots will not necessarily make good laws, even if, by the exercise

of the useful gift of Belial, or through the secret working of the party machine, he contrive to obtain at an election more votes than another candidate who has made a life-long study of history and other subjects, a knowledge of which is essential to the wise exercise of legislative powers. "Bad laws," said Burke in his well-known speech at Bristol, "are the worst sort of tyranny." If so, bad law-makers are the "worst sort" of tyrants. Ignorant law-makers must necessarily be bad law-makers. And of all kinds of tyranny that of ignorance is the least tolerable because the most contemptible.

In theory, the best way to raise the intellectual and moral status of an elected Chamber would obviously be to entrust the task of choosing its members only to competent electors. A franchise resting on the four-fold basis of age to ensure experience, nationality to ensure patriotism, education to ensure knowledge, and property to ensure a sense of responsibility, would seem to satisfy, in the main, this requirement. Were it possible, a system of proportional voting, in which votes would reflect moral and intellectual rather than numerical values, might be preferred, but the tests it would require could hardly be applied without the employment of a large and expensive army of censors. Assuming both these remedies to lie outside the sphere of what is commonly called "practical politics" under present conditions, a third, less difficult to bring into operation, might be suggested with the object of uniting capacity to responsibility. Inasmuch as its adoption would not be attended by any curtailment of the electoral privileges now enjoyed by the mass of the adult population, and the only persons whose interests would be injuriously affected by it would be persons whose claims to consideration are quite negligible, it might afford the desired *via media*.

It is usual to describe legislators who have occupied seats in Parliament for fairly long periods as "professional" politicians. The term is scarcely correct, seeing that the members of all recognized professions have had to undergo, before admission to them, a special course of training and preparation, and to pass stringent examinations. No man can practise as a lawyer or doctor unless he has spent years previously in the study of law or medicine. Were we to choose our doctors as we choose our legislators, only one class in the community would benefit by the change—that of undertakers. To the rational mind it seems a little strange that, while we compel the blacksmith to learn his trade before we consider him fit to shoe a horse, we allow the merest political apprentice to help to make our laws. We treat national life as if it were a matter of far less importance than individual life. It

would be more correct to call our Parliamentary veterans "habitual" than "professional" politicians, since, although no doubt Parliamentary experience makes men proficient in the technicalities of Parliamentary procedure, and tends to perfect skill in debate and platform oratory, it affords no guarantee whatever that even after twenty years' unbroken membership of Parliament any legislator shall have acquired the extensive and varied knowledge necessary for his vocation. Many examples of lamentable ignorance exhibited by modern politicians, who have not only had long Parliamentary experience but who have held high and responsible positions, might be given. Only the other day a British Prime Minister amused European statesmen by his ignorance of the geographical position of Teschen, and educated critics at home by a ludicrous comparison between his work, as peace negotiator, at Paris, and that of Castlereagh over a century ago. Economic fallacies, discernible even by school boys of moderate intelligence, abound in the speeches of well-known politicians. The candidate for election of a too familiar type, indeed, plumps down before the electors a bundle of crude class prejudices, and calls them his "political opinions." The blind are allowed to lead the blind, and quacks to usurp the functions of physicians.

Setting aside as, for the present at least, impracticable a rational reform of the franchise, is there no remedy for this deplorable state of things? Must General Elections continue to be, as they have hitherto been, huge gambles viewed with contempt by the educated, trepidation by all citizens with substantial interests at stake, and amusement by the flippant and the light-hearted? Is it a good thing for the country that the proceedings of its legislators should excite among the sober-minded only the interest of apprehension? Is it quite proper that politics should be commonly regarded as a game of cards in which delusive promises and insincere professions are the trumps, and that the task of dealing with problems involving national life or death should only too often be entrusted to the hands of well-meaning ignorance?

Herbert Spencer's remark, "Uninstructed legislators have in past times continually increased human suffering in their endeavours to mitigate it," seems to point out a possible path to improvement. If—and few surely will challenge the statement—lack of sufficient knowledge on the part of legislators is one of the main causes of unwise legislation, does not common-sense suggest that measures should be taken to exclude ignorant men from Parliament by prohibiting any person from offering his services as a legislator to the electors unless he

had previously passed through a special course of training, and received a certificate of legislative competency?

This proposal merely implies that the principle universally adopted in all of the ordinary professions, or trades, should be extended to politics. It would not be impossible to arrange special classes at our universities for the training of students of politics, who would receive special instruction in such essential subjects as history, political economy, political as well as physical and commercial geography, constitutional law and the science of jurisprudence. After the completion of his course it would be obligatory for each student of good character to satisfy a competent board of examiners that he had acquired an equipment of special knowledge, sufficient for the requirements of a legislator, and would then graduate as M.P., Master of Politics. Only persons thus distinguished would be allowed to stand for Parliament. In order that indigent ability might not be penalized, special provision should be made for the free admission to the proposed classes of scholars of exceptional talent, who could not pay the ordinary fees, and perhaps, to prevent overcrowding, it might be found expedient to devise some means by which applicants who failed to reach a certain standard of natural intelligence should be entirely excluded.

It may be contended that the application of tests such as those suggested to aspirants to Parliamentary careers would seriously limit the electors' freedom of choice in selecting their representatives. Undoubtedly it would do so, and for their own good. Their choice, it may be remarked, is already subjected to certain salutary restrictions. Neither madmen, criminals, foreigners, children, nor members of the civil service are allowed to offer their services to the electors. Why should ignorant quacks or unscrupulous adventurers be allowed to do so? The members of a Friendly Society, when the position of lodge doctor is vacant, do not complain because they are only allowed to appoint a qualified medical man to the position. Why should the average elector complain if his choice of a representative were limited to candidates qualified by character and knowledge to serve him faithfully? Surely he would not prefer to be represented by an ignoramus or plausible self-seeker! The present writer humbly submits that the adoption of the selective method just suggested, or another of a similar kind, designed to eliminate from our legislators the politically unfit, would assist considerably in reconciling democracy with efficiency, and promote wise and stable government. Politics would become a real and most honourable profession, whose prizes would be open to talent in all classes

of society, and those engaged in public life would occupy a far higher position in the general estimation than unfortunately they do now. While, of course, no process of elimination could prevent the occasional appearance in our legislatures of unworthy members, these would be too few to cause harm, and, at worst, an educated demagogue were less dangerous than an uneducated one. Learning proverbially tends towards moderation and refinement. Cultured ability is the foe of violence, both of speech and action, and a system under which the functions of legislation would be exercised only by men who represented the higher, rather than the lower intelligence of the people, would at least approximate to the ideal form of government, the true aristocracy, the rule of the best.



## FROM THE EDITOR'S CHAIR.

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THIS issue of the Journal contains articles dealing with Politics, which Huxley regarded as one of the two great human interests, as distinguished from the purely intellectual interest of Science. Critics of our national defects tell us that Science is the last thing we are interested in, that the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake does not pay, and therefore should not be paid for. It is only in recent years that Science has been found to pay through its multifarious applications. We have had to thank Germany for teaching us that lesson with many stripes and much humiliation. Yet even in the year before the war a scientific expert could be hired by an English business man for about a third of what his German competitor gladly paid. According to Augustine Birrell, the three things "the English worry themselves about" are Politics, Business and Religion. Science is thus left wholly out of the list, while Religion comes in a bad third. A philosophical consideration of Business may be postponed for the present. It is not a subject to be dealt with lightly in an Editorial "aside." Business men themselves shrink from discussing it in its true inwardness. Dale, of Birmingham, when visiting the United States, found leading American business men to be like the Athenians—a very religious folk. They were all very willing to talk about their souls, he said, but with one accord very reluctant to talk about business. They may have had good reasons for this reluctance, but it makes us doubt whether they were really willing to talk about their souls. "Things have come to a pretty pass, when Religion is allowed to invade the sphere of private life," said Lord Melbourne on one occasion after hearing a sermon which dealt with sin in the particular and concrete, and not in general as a mysterious inherited ailment. This Journal has no religious or political policy or opinions, for the simple reason that its contributors and its readers have so many. But if it has no opinions, it has, at any rate, one strong conviction, viz., that free discussion is less dangerous than no discussion. This was not the opinion of Dr. Johnson, who said that "if every sceptic in Theology may teach his follies there can be no Religion." To which the philosopher can only reply, Oh man of little faith! Nor is it the attitude of the reverend Bishop who said apropos of one of the mysteries, that "it was one of those things which are better left undiscussed, a phrase which suggested much earnestness of thought, while it spared him the exertion of thinking at all."

The author of the article on Democracy and Statesmanship discusses the practical problem of how to secure the government of the best while retaining the forms of the democratic State. It is possible to have a democratic (social) atmosphere, in the absence of a democratic (political) organisation. On the other hand, it is possible to have the latter without having the former. Under the forms of a democratic political constitution there may be an absence of real liberty. "Take a good look at it," said an American to a European visitor as the steamer was passing the statue of Liberty at the entrance to New York Harbour. "It's the last you'll see of liberty till you leave the country." This, of course, was the humorous exaggeration of a man suffering from other people's interference with his personal liberties. Under Bolshevism, if for the moment we regard Bolshevism as a form of democracy, Russia has not gained liberty but only exchanged one form of tyranny for another. Democracy, it is often argued, is to be condemned on the ground that a system of government which commits the most difficult and complex problems to the vote of the majority, that is, of the least educated and competent, seems sheer madness. It is easy to secure a verdict against Democracy when the indictment is framed in these terms. Such unqualified condemnation of Democracy is not confined to Conservative reactionaries, whose language is often only the rhetorical exaggeration of the political partisan. Here are the words of Lenin in a speech delivered June 13th, 1920: "Freedom is a bourgeois notion . . . Russia must get rid of the idea that happiness is to be attained by letting every man do as he likes. An iron government composed of a few unshrinking men is what Russia wants and Russia has." If the choice is to be between two militarisms, some of us might prefer the Ironsides of Cromwell to Lenin's Ironsides, the militarism of the strong-willed great-hearted Puritan to the militarism of the cold-blooded cynical Bolshevik; but democratic self-government is inconsistent with any form of militarism. A Dictatorship of the Proletariat has as little moral justification as any other tyranny, even when the Dictator, like Lenin, tries to excuse his tyranny by promising that it is only provisional. A small minority in power has no right to complain if it is upset violently by another small minority, for every attempt to impose minority rule is ultimately based on force. And violence provokes violence as surely as in a vendetta, blood calls for blood. There can be only one occasion when justification may be claimed for the attempt of the minority to seize political power by force, and that is when the actual constitution of society makes it impossible for the minority to

become a majority under the ordinary forms of law, or to make its voice heard by the powers that be.

If Democracy is to be identified with what, after all, is only one of its characteristics, viz., an arrangement for ascertaining the will of the majority, then Democracy is the safest form of State organisation, and in the long run the most stable. There need be no fear of the permanence of Democracy so long as a minority is not prevented from giving expression to its opinions, however wrong-headed those opinions may seem to be to the wise heads or wooden heads of the majority; and so long as a minority has the sense to understand that it has no right to impose its mind or will on the majority, however right and righteous the minority may think its own mind and will to be.

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Democracy, however, is more than the machinery for ascertaining the will of the majority at stated intervals. Our representative system has its defects, some of which are becoming almost unbearable, except to the interested politician who makes his living on the game, as a bookmaker thrives on the folly of his fellows. Democracy is really a much larger and broader thing than the machinery of representative government. Lowndes Dickinson rather happily describes Democracy as "the whole sum of the arrangements whereby all the faculties of a nation are brought to bear upon its public life." Every existing Democracy falls grievously short of this ideal. Consider for a moment the ludicrous nature of the description of any governing political assembly, as an institution through which the faculties of a nation are brought to bear upon its public life. In many cases care is even taken to exclude the most capable and intelligent citizens from taking an active share in politics. The result is that the capable and intelligent citizen, who is also unselfish and high-minded, has to find some other scope for his energies, while the capable and intelligent citizen, who is neither unselfish nor high-minded, finds or makes opportunities for leading Democracy by the nose, and making the puppet politicians dance to the tunes he pleases to call.

Accepting as a community Lowndes Dickinson's description of the Democratic ideal, we might proceed with some confidence to change and adapt our machinery to the needs of a complex society in continuous process of transformation, provided we understand that life is more than machinery, and that "the faculties of a nation" can be brought to bear on its public life in countless other ways than through the medium of what is called politics. Far too much importance has been given to political activity in the narrow and popular sense of

the term. It is, after all, only one expression of the energies which control national life. Our political organisation is breaking down because the State has become too big and complex a thing to be run on the old machine lines, with the fixed and often stupid traditions of party politics. The devolution of the powers or functions of the central political assembly is a problem which has come at last within the range of practical political discussion. That devolution may take one or both of two directions. The Political Parliament may, in the first place, devolve at any rate part of its control over certain areas requiring special attention which a crowd of untrained and half-educated legislators are incapable of giving. It is a public scandal and a growing national danger that the great rural interests of Australia should be at the mercy of the city business man or professional politician. The other direction which devolution may take is the one suggested by Syndicalism, and which is therefore regarded by many as too revolutionary, unpractical, un-English, and dangerous even to discuss. We have, however, reached a point at which it is becoming more dangerous not to discuss it. "Socialistic" has long lost its terrors, and "Bolshevik" in its present indiscriminating use will soon lose its terrors as a term conveying opprobrium and malediction. Functional representation is perhaps the only original and valuable idea which Syndicalism has to offer to practical politics, and it seems as if some form and some measure of functional representation will have to be added to the existing system of representation of geographical areas. Our Parliamentary Assembly is rapidly becoming a parody of Representative Government. The alternative methods of reform would seem to be either (a) to add functional representation to representation of geographical areas, retaining the central Parliamentary Assembly, or (b) a gradual devolution of powers to other bodies, which would be charged with the control of certain national functions, mainly economic in their nature. Each of these alternatives has its difficulties, but our present attitude, which is to refuse to consider either, is perhaps the most dangerous of all.

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The great objection to any elaborate scheme of delegation or devolution of powers and functions is that it implies an enormous and premature extension of the machinery of government control and interference. The political philosopher, while he must always keep an ear open to the suggestions of the idealist, must never close the other ear to the warnings of the men who have learned wisdom at first hand from direct contact with the realities of experience. And their verdict is

that to multiply officials and boards and commissions is to reduce and divide responsibility, to discourage initiative, and to muzzle enterprise. These dangers might exist also in a society which was not organised on a democratic basis, but in a democratised society the official is nearly always very much afraid of something or some one. He has to think so much about himself and his position that his mind is not free to think enough about his job, and his will is not free to do the right thing and take the risks. Heroic measures may be necessary in a crisis, as in the Great War, or in a threatened collapse of the national economy, but in the normal life of political society it is unwise to press forward practical policies too far in advance of the motives and moralities which are indispensable for their success. The President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United Kingdom said, after years of government control and management of business, "Some of us have been behind the scenes and have been the victims of the soul-destroying and paralysing system that seems to be inseparable from government control. What are its characteristics? Government control is always extravagant and wasteful. It destroys all initiative. It stereotypes mediocrity. It is self-satisfied. It scorns advice. The idea of co-ordination is foreign to its nature." The distinguished American organiser, Mr. Hoover, said of the nationalised control of industry during the Great War, that "so far every trial had reduced production."

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The author of *Democracy and Statesmanship* suggests one change as a remedy for the present distressful state of democratic government—selection by a system of training and examination of a number of individuals, from whom alone the electors would be permitted to choose representatives. The assumption and the hope seems to be that this change, if effected, would, *other things remaining the same*, produce what is so much to be desired, government by the best. It is possible to put too great a trust in machinery, even though the machinery be educational machinery. China has had the advantage of an educational machinery for many centuries, designed for the purpose of discovering who are the best fitted to become rulers of the state. It may seem a short and easy way to the desired end, to restrict the choice of the electors to certain individuals who are stamped with the approval of certain other individuals, but here as elsewhere the longest way round may be the shortest way home. Let us remember our accepted definition. Democracy is the whole sum of the arrangements whereby all the faculties of a nation are brought to bear

upon its public life. Why not face the larger task (the accomplishment of which would include the lesser), the task of improving the general arrangements whereby the faculties of the nation are trained and educated. That would imply a raising of the leaving school age for all classes of children, and next, a revaluation of the ends of our national education, and a reorganisation of the means by which we at present somewhat fatuously expect to attain those ends. Unfortunately experience seems to show that the organisation of national education is always in danger of being "bureaucratised." The worst of all tyrants may be an organised public opinion against which there is no appeal. It matters little whether the bureaucratic tyranny be autocratic or democratic, except perhaps that the former is more efficient. The German nation became highly efficient under its educational bureaucracy, but it lost its soul in the process. A bureaucracy will not be less a bureaucracy, when controlled by a Trades Hall Council. Of course then as now men will be cheated and cheat themselves with phrases. Here are some, taken from the "Australian Worker." "Unionism must be democratic. It must be self-governing in the most literal sense. It must act from the mass to the unit, not from the unit to the mass. The unit errs, the mass never errs, for it sits as its own judge, and there is no one competent to impeach it." Perhaps the best comment on this may be found in a remark of Mr. Bertrand Russell. "Even in a democracy, all questions except a few, are decided by a small number of officials and eminent men, and even the few questions left to popular vote are decided by a diffused mass psychology, not by individual initiative." We are left then in the end with a "diffused mass psychology," the revised form of *Vox Populi*, *Vox Dei*, the final court of appeal. "Do you mean to say," said one indignant Chartist to another, (quoted by the late Bishop Creighton) "that there is any question that I cannot get to the bottom of in one night?" It is such pathetic ignorance which delivers the worker with his helpless strength into the hands of his leaders, whether they be honest and unselfish, or wily adventurers, or hard pitiless fanatics of one idea. A democracy under bureaucratic rule may be little better than an organised mob, and an organised mob may be the most dangerous of all mobs.

The final conclusion would thus seem a pessimistic one, that despotism is a danger under every possible form of government. We must find whatever comfort is possible in the reflection that Democracy is the least objectionable of all forms of government since it is the form which contains the easiest and best means of correcting its own defects. "I am a demo-

crat," said Mr. Zangwill in his *War for the World*, "with profound mistrust of the people. Yet democracy is the least bad of alternatives, and contains its own antidote."

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The moralist has always the last word in debate, even when the debate takes place within the individual himself, for in every man there sits a court of judgment, with assessors, prosecutor and devil's advocate, all complete.

It is after all the people who make the state, and before we can have a democracy, we must have democrats. To have democrats we must have free men, and it is not machinery, economic, ecclesiastical, or political machinery, that can make men free, organisation however perfect, or laws however good. We shall not have a free democracy until the people have learned to free themselves. It is not so very difficult to get rid of external fetters. Where there's a will, there's a way. It requires little wisdom to destroy an institution. The hardest of all tasks is for men to free themselves from ignorance, superstition, envy, jealousy, and fear. There is a moral poverty, a poverty of the soul, a poverty of ideas, more hopeless than any poverty of the purse. The slave's finest dream is to take the place of his master. The proletarian slave dreams of becoming the proletarian dictator, and of chastising with scorpions instead of with whips. The poor man, according to Mr. Bernard Shaw, wants wealth in order to wallow in all the satisfactions which the refined soul has learned to disdain. It is possible for a man to box the compass of his desires, and to be as poverty stricken in soul in the end as at the beginning. "It is not by a man's purse but by his character that he is rich or poor," said R. L. Stevenson. "Barney will be poor. Alick will be poor; let them go where they will and wreck all the governments under heaven, they will be poor until they die." "The longer I live," said Robert Earl Lytton, "the greater grows my misfaith in all the purely political and social contrivances for improving the world. . . I cannot doubt that the Christian method which begins with the individual is preferable to the revolutionary one which begins with the mass. The revolutionary impulse is always trying to make avalanches, but its material is mud, and with mud you can only make messes."

The moralist having thus delivered his soul, may now willingly confess that all this is no argument against reform and (oh blessed word) reconstruction of social and political conditions. He may admit, that to separate moral and spiritual reform from social and political reconstruction, and

to demand the one as the necessary antecedent of the other, is to return to the old fallacy which vitiated the ethics and theologies of the past, viz,—that the soul is a separate or separable entity, and can be doctored and disciplined, saved or damned, apart from reference to the conditions in which it lives and moves and has its being. If soul and body are so intimately related that the plan of attack which concentrates on the soul and neglects the body is foolish strategy and suicidal tactics, shall we not say the same of the relation of the national soul to the body politic, and of the relation of the moral and spiritual task to the work of the social and political reformer?



## REVIEWS.

TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS. By L. Wittgenstein. English translation, along with the German original. Introduction by Bertrand Russell, F.R.S. Published by Kegan Paul. Pp. 189. (Our copy from publishers.)

Both as regards substance and style, this is a remarkable book. Mr. Russell, to whom its readers will be grateful for an expository introduction, thinks that the author has achieved the extraordinarily difficult and important work of constructing a theory of logic, "which is not at any point obviously wrong" (p. 23). This logical theory is a development of modern investigations in "mathematical" logic, and as a contribution to this subject its value is undoubted. The book is written in numbered paragraphs, many of which are single short sentences. The first runs: "The world is everything that is the case." The author states that the book deals with "The problems of philosophy" (p. 27). It attempts to demonstrate that these "problems" arise because of a misunderstanding of the logic of language, and that a correct logic solves them by shewing that they do not exist. The author sums up the whole meaning of his book in the statement: "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent" (p. 27). That of which one cannot speak, however, turns out to be that of which philosophy has always professed to speak. The author's meaning may be suggested by saying that the philosophical object, like the reality of the mystic vision, is inexpressible. A corollary is that the only genuine questions are questions of natural science. "The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e., the propositions on natural science, i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feelings that we were teaching him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct method" (pp. 188-9). The "deepest problems" are "*no* problems" (p. 63). "We feel that even if all *possible* scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course, there is then no question left, and just this is the answer" (p. 187). These quotations suggest one feature of the book: the other is the technical logic. For details concerning the latter the book itself must be read; but not the least interesting theory here is that logic is essentially tautology. "Proof in logic is only a mechanical expedient to facilitate the recognition of tautology, where it is complicated" (p. 167). Briefly, it may be said that this is a book which no serious student of philosophy can afford to neglect.

—B.M.

"THE SUPREMACY OF SPIRIT." By C. A. Richardson, M.A. Kegan Paul, 1922, pp. VII., 159. (Our copy from publishers.)

The author, having recently published "Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy," for the benefit of philosophers, now offers a less detailed and less technical account of his views for the benefit of a wider public. The book makes interesting and easy reading, and covers a wide range of topics, such as the nature of science and philosophy, the main contemporary philosophic theories, the problems of space-time, immortality, and freedom, the body-mind relation, the unconscious,

and "physical" phenomena. And all this within 160 brief pages! Perhaps the best to be hoped for from such popularisations is that, begetting in the thoughtful "plain man" an interest in the philosophical purpose, they may lead him beyond themselves—a hope which our author would doubtless cherish. Would that all the Lord's people were philosophers, in temper if not in occupation!

Mr. Richardson devotes about two-thirds of the book to a sketch of his general theory. He hesitates between pluralism and monism, and in trying to do justice to both he seems to land finally in the latter, in a kind of pantheistic pluralism. The monads constituting reality interact in virtue of identity of spiritual essence, but the working out of this difficult view is reserved for a future book, from which it will be interesting to learn how much of pluralism is conserved at the end. In the meantime the present book is a fragment, because it posits but does not explain interaction, and in spite of the illuminating remark on its wrapper that "a conclusion completes the work."

One or two of Richardson's main positions may be briefly examined. His epistemology is rather confusing. He claims that there are two kinds of facts (p. 3), sense data and logical "facts," by which he means such laws as Contradiction, Excluded Middle, etc. Also there are two realms of certainty (p. 6), the deliverances of sense and of reason respectively. Of course, truth attaches to propositions, so that "the sky is blue" is typical of one kind of certainty, and a mathematical proposition is representative of the other kind. But the judgment, "the sky is blue," is not merely a deliverance of sense, but is an interpretation thereof in (explicitly or implicitly) universal terms; just as a principle logically conceived is a universal explanation of the particular. It is fatal to sunder datum from interpretation—indeed a *mere* sense datum, e.g., a patch of blue, is not a fact for any human mind, and still less can we be certain about it, until we can place or interpret it. Bradley's warning (*Mind*, N.S., Vol. XVIII. p. 331) is very much to the point: "In your search for independent facts and for infallible truths you may go so low that, when you have descended below the level of error, you find yourself below the level of any fact or of any truth which you can use." What certainty is there in the simple sensing of a patch of blue? To call it "blue" or "color" is at once to transcend sense and enter the realm of possible logical certainty. If the certainty lies in something "being there," of what use is this? And, in any case, the something may vanish or change, and its persistence be recoverable, if at all, only by further sensing; whereupon we again transcend simple sensation, and have the rudiments at least of a proposition recognisable by logic. We certainly cannot err about our sense-data, but then neither can we possess truth about them. Nor is it the case that we have either (a) two realms of certainty of which one is, and the other is not, guaranteed by logic—so much Richardson really admits when he reserves truth to propositions, for there are no propositions on the level of sensation—or (b) two realms of certainty each with a logic of its own. This would simply drive us to a more inclusive logic or to intellectual chaos. It is one of Richardson's main doctrines that sure knowledge is confined to sense data and is therefore private for each person, and yet he feels compelled to recognise "objects of thinking of a higher order" (p. 7), i.e., of the logical understanding. But this thinking and its objects are no longer private, since reason is universal. Thus he gets two orders of knowledge (and certainty) between which he leaves fixed a great gulf. Had he avoided the initial fallacy of

calling the sensing of data, knowledge, he must have come to see that this term is never applicable to the purely private, but only to the universal, and that there is only one realm of certainty, viz., that in which the logical understanding operates. About a possibly higher intuition we shall say nothing.

There are other debatable matters, of which we shall select but one, and it concerns the constitution of reality. To bring out the difficulty at once, we will contrast some of Richardson's contentions. On the one hand, he says that "a subject has quite a different *type* of being from that of an object," and subjects can never be objects, nor can objects be subjects (p. 15). This is because "I am acquainted with the object (which is not identical with me), but . . . realise myself." On the other hand, it is one of his chief postulates that reality is all of one piece and is spiritual, that the individual reals are alike in being spiritual beings, monads, or subjects of experience, and that this holds through the whole range of being from inanimate matter to man. At once we enquire, what are we to make of objects which *ex hypothesi* are beings quite different in type from monads? It helps us not at all to be told that objects are phenomena, appearances which result from the interaction of monads, especially since we have been told that phenomena constitute one realm of certainty. Moreover, Richardson expressly disclaims contrasting appearance with reality (p. 50). We thus seem to be left with a dualism of subject being and object being. The situation becomes more desperate if one should enquire further, what am I to make of the alleged subjects other than myself? Objects I know, and myself I realise, but what are these? For I realise only myself, and between me and other subjects stands the veil of objects. If other subjects are "objects of thinking of a higher order," then by following the author's method we have a third type of being. One suspects that all this confusion is due to the basic epistemology being tainted with solipsism, and to the ultimate antagonism between the author's epistemology and ontology. The former seems to need a radical overhauling.

One word more. There is a chapter given to the consideration of "physical" phenomena, and Richardson rightly says that (a) we must be prepared to admit that there are such phenomena, and (b) that these should in many cases be required in greater numbers, and in all cases should be subjected to impartial and rigorous experimental examination. But it would seem that he is not ready to practise what he advises, and that in his zeal to apply his general theory he has suggested explanations in advance of confirmed scientific findings. This may make popular reading matter, but it is bad philosophy, for there is no reason why the phenomena in question should not be made to yield veritable scientific hypotheses before they become matter for confident philosophic interpretation.

—A.C.F.

SOME APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Dr. Oskar P. Lister.  
Authorised English Version. London: George Allen and Unwin.  
(Our copy from Messrs. Angus & Robertson, Ltd., Sydney.)

Here is an "olla podrida" of Freudian doctrine as applied to a encyclopaedia of psycho-analytic research. Its object is rather to introduce the reader to a method of investigation which has already begun its triumphant entry into many departments of mental science." Hence the author proceeds to apply the Freudian doctrine to the fields of Academic Psychology, Peace and War, Art, Philosophy, Ethics,

Child-life and Religion. We are surprised to learn that "Wit" has not been included among the items of the feast.

To the initiate, prepared by a Freudian teaching of psycho-analysis, this book offers an introduction to many sides of life, if, indeed, he is prepared to follow the "master" to the final extremes of the theory. The book is reminiscent of a story coming from a far-off land. At a meeting of the "psycho-analysts," the subject for discussion was the "War Neuroses." On the motion of the president discussion was withheld on the ground that "Freud was about to issue a work on the subject." "What better example," commented a cy-general view of life. The book "does not profess to be an exhaustive nical member, "could one have of a 'father' complex?" —A.H.M.

METHODS AND EXPERIMENTS IN MENTAL TESTS. By C. A. Richardson, London, Harrap. 1922.

This book, as it states, is concerned "not with the theory, but with the practice of Intelligence Tests for mental capacity." Four main topics are dealt with, (1) the relation between Intelligence and Educability, (2) the derivation of mental ages from the Scores of a group test, (3) the method of estimating Intelligence Quotients of adolescents and adults, and (4) the reliability of a group test. The book is well written and worth reading, although one may be permitted to express dissent, when the author identifies intelligence with educability.

By the same author THE SIMPLEX GROUP INTELLIGENCE SCALE (Harrap) will be found of use, particularly to teachers who wish to grade their pupils in the order of their ability to do this test. —G.E.P.

"BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE." "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego." Both by Sigmund Freud. International Psycho-analytical Library. George Allen & Unwin, 1922. (Our copies from Angus and Robertson.)

These two publications are interesting because in them Freud has undertaken the examination of certain aspects of traditional psychology in the light of his own theories. In the former, for example, he discusses the origin of pleasure and pain, as also the meaning of instinct. In the latter, he traverses the views held about the psychological principles which govern the group. As might be expected, he takes an independent course, interpreting group cohesion in terms of *libido* rather than in terms of suggestion, contagion, and the herd instinct. —H.T.L.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY. Vol. VI., Part 4. Merz Memorial Number. 1923.

Contains personal reminiscences of the late John Theodore Merz, by several friends, and a long and admirable estimate of his philosophical work by Professor Hoernlé. Dr. Merz, like Hodgson and Crozier, was more read and appreciated outside academic circles than within. Academic teachers of Philosophy are too much inclined to ignore original work which lies outside the beaten professional track. Happily, many of their students are more liberal in their outlook, and find spiritual sustenance in many books that are not recommended for examination purposes. Dr. Merz was best known by his History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, but some of his minor writings are perhaps more interesting and certainly more suggestive and stimulating. The central problem of all his philosophical thinking was the relation of Philosophy to Religion. In this he was strongly influenced by Kant and Post-Kantian thought,

even although in matters epistemological, his filiation was to Locke and Hume and the English School of Psychology. He held strongly that Religion was a form of rational knowledge, and that through Religion, the "abstract" views of common sense and science could be revised and supplemented. Religion, far from being an illusion, reveals in Professor Hoernlé's words, "the fundamental nature of reality as completely as our minds can grasp it." The defects and limitations of religious thought spring not from "abstraction," which is the vice of lower levels of thinking, but from the inherent finiteness of the human mind. Dr. Merz was in the Platonic tradition, in so far as he maintained the synoptic nature of the philosophic mission. With advancing knowledge, each age demands a new synthesis, which will attempt to reconcile the various conflicts in the spiritual life of humanity, and include not only the results of technical knowledge, but also current movements in art, literature, morals and religion.

**MATTER, LIFE, MIND, AND GOD.** By Professor R. F. A. Hoernlé, Armstrong College, University of Durham. Methuen & Co., London. 1923. 6/- net.

Contains five lectures on Contemporary Tendencies of Thought, delivered to a general audience, with an excellent bibliography at the end of each lecture. This book will be found helpful by both the philosophical student and the general reader. It is not a dry compendium or summary of opinions, but an enlightened and enlightening review and estimate of all the more important philosophical problems of our time. There is not a dull page in the book, yet there is nothing of the superficial or superfluous. In the hands of a good teacher, this volume would be an admirable text-book for use in a W.E.A. Tutorial Class in Philosophy, but it may also be recommended to all those who find it difficult to see their way through the mazes of modern thought.

**CHRISTIAN TRADITION AND CHRISTIAN OUTLOOK.** By the Rev. K. T. Henderson, M.A., Melbourne. The Australian Student Christian Movement Corporation. 1923. 2/-.

Written by a man of ability, courage, and insight, who can sympathise with both Modernism and Traditionalism, but who is afraid of neither. A "new synthesis between religion and national life is required," and the responsibility for effecting it "rests primarily with educated young Australians." Thus the youth which is the hope of the church is also the hope of the nation. Mr. Henderson is one of the representatives of a new religious movement, with brains behind it, which is being carried on with freedom from prejudice, virile energy, and moral enthusiasm. While not losing touch with the official churches, it refuses to be dominated by them, which is what one would expect from Young Australia. "Our churches have no historical excuse for rigidity in intellectual statement, worship, or any other form of life." This little book deals in an interesting and vigorous way with most of the problems which thoughtful young Australians are being called upon to face. The chapters on *The Intellectual Presentation*, and *The Stark Necessity of Thinking*, are especially noteworthy in view of recent discussion.

**"RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS."** Edited by Rufus M. Jones. Macmillan Co., New York. 1923. (Our copy from Angus & Robertson.) Price 5/-.

The aim of this book is to reinterpret, in the light of present-day knowledge, ten great central problems of religion—how we are to think of God, Christ, Man, Nature, Human Relationships, the Bible, the King-

dom of God, Evil, Progress, and the Life Beyond. The book is edited by the well-known historian of Quakerism, who also contributes the first three chapters. The great-souled, public-spirited Quaker, Seebohm Rowntree, of York, writes on Society and Human Relationships in his usual sympathetic and effective way. Professor Jacks, Editor of the *Hibbert Journal*, contributes the most philosophic chapter in the volume—How shall we think of evil? He deals with this most important of problems in a way which will satisfy the plain man who loves honesty and directness of statement, and also the philosopher who dislikes the false sentiment and juggling with words in which the professional teachers of religion too often indulge. The appearance of this book is another sign of the times. It shows theology in process of purging itself of medieval methods and assumptions, and becoming a philosophic treatment of religious experience from the point of view of men who believe that God reveals Himself in Scripture, in man, in society, through a growing kingdom, and in those great moral and spiritual events and purposes which express his thought and will, and that He is "revealed supremely in that one Person who is most like Him and the nearest like us, i.e., in Jesus Christ." This volume is what the Editor claims for it in the preface, "an honest book written by men who have said what they sincerely believe."

**THE EUCKEN REVIEW.** Organ of the Eucken Society. No. 1. January, 1923. Published (in English) by the Eucken Society, Jena. Monthly, 6d. Yearly subscription, 4/-.

Contains two interesting lectures by Eucken himself, on *Religion and Civilisation*, and *Present-Day Problems of Humanity*. In the introductory appeal, the aims of the Eucken Society are thus stated,— "We believe in a supreme spiritual life of divine origin, in which we partake by means of our aspirations and actions. While fully acknowledging the necessity of economic life, we do not wish it to be the final aim and to absorb all our efforts. The advance and purification of man in all aspects of his being and the improvement of mankind are of more importance to us than even economic progress. Thus religious and social work must go hand in hand, each helping and advancing the other. We consequently fight against the shallowness and superficiality of our time, and against the moral degeneration of the present day. We wish to emphasise strongly the German individuality and to shake off all that is alien and immaterial to the national character, without, however, advocating a narrow nationalism. As God's soldiers, we will go forth to win a new and harmonious spiritual culture. We will do battle for the cause of God, and thereby also for our poor country. All who wish to join us in true and loyal fellowship will be heartily welcome."

**THE EDINBURGH LECTURES ON MENTAL SCIENCE.** The Dore Lectures on Mental Science. The Law and the Word. The Creative Process in the Individual. Bible Mystery and Bible Meanings. 5 Vols., by T. Toward. Published by A. M. Philpot. (Our copies from Cole's Book Arcade, Sydney.)

These volumes contain, for those whose philosophical taste is not too discriminating, a great deal of miscellaneous feeding. At the same time, works which were praised by the late William James, cannot be dismissed with contempt by the superior critic. The author was a man of broad sympathies. His philosophy was largely eclectic, although he insisted on certain "principles" of interpretation. It is at times a strange mingling of rationalism and mysticism, with

many reminiscences of ancient and mediaeval thought. Thus "no starting point of creation is conceivable other than the Self-Contemplation of the Divine Spirit" (*Creative Process*). He adopts as a "working hypothesis" the existence of an "essence intermediate between the Originating Spirit and the world of external manifestation." This is the *Anima Mundi* of mediaeval thought, the Soul of the World, distinguished from the *Animus Dei*, or Divine Spirit; (*Bible Mystery and Bible Meaning*). The author's method of treating the Bible is the usual alternation of the literal and symbolic or figurative, according to which is found to be the more convenient mode of interpretation.

**THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA.** Sydney. Published weekly. Price, 1/-.

Contains several articles giving accounts of the results of research work, of interest to students of scientific methods.

**IN THE MENTAL WORKSHOP.** Reflections on Modern Psychopathy. By Ethel Mortimer Langdon. Sydney. Penfold & Co. 1922.

Is a sign of the awakened public interest in psycho-therapeutic methods, but has little other value.

**WORLD PEACE.** Arunachal Mission. Published weekly. Price, 2 annas. Calcutta.

Continues on its hopeful way, advocating an Economic World State, and the War against War. "Bolshevism is the natural fruit of the tree of existing social order." As a proof of how Bolshevism is nurtured, a Calcutta incident is described. "A rich man's son was married, and there was a most reckless and heartless waste of money. 100,000 rupees were spent on the bridal procession, and 10,000 rupees on flowers alone. There was a stupid display of pomp and pageantry, a march of camels, etc., etc." It sounds familiar, all but the camels. As a sign of the (Indian) times, it may be noticed that *World Peace* strongly supports a new Indian Marriage Bill permitting those who wish, to marry outside the caste. "This bill is a great necessity and thoroughly in consonance with the spirit of the age, and it is an expression of the demand of the human soul." The general aim of the *World Peace* may be described as an attempt to synthesise what is spiritually best in East and West. It reprints Eucken's last address and is broadly sympathetic in its attitude to much in Western civilisation. All this is combined with an Eastern mysticism, which is sometimes vague to the point of unintelligibility.

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## NOTES AND NEWS.

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The first annual meeting of the Association took place at Sydney University on Saturday, 19th May. Four papers on Psycho-Analysis were read. Two of these appear in this number of the Journal; the others will be published in next issue.

The N.S.W. Branch of the Association will hold the first meeting of the 1923 Session on Thursday, 27th June, in the Philosophy Lecture Hall, Sydney University. Professor F. Anderson will deliver an Inaugural Lecture on Social Classes and the State.

The demand for the first number of the Journal, and for the two Monographs, was greater than was anticipated. New impressions are now in course of distribution. The Business Secretary will supply copies, post free, on receipt of published price.

The next (September) issue of the Journal will include articles on "Waste," by G. R. Knibbs, C.M.G., Director of the Institute of Science and Industry; "The Educational Implications of the I.Q.," by Professor John Adams (late of London University); "The Unconscious in relation to Psycho-Analytic Theory," by Professor McKellar Stewart, Adelaide University.

The December issue of the Journal will include a Symposium on the meaning of Philosophy, by Professors B. Muscio (Sydney), W. Anderson (Auckland), and Boyce Gibson (Melbourne).

Arrangements are being made for a visit to Australia of Professor John Adams, M.A., LL.D., in 1924. It is hoped that he will be able to give a short course of lectures at each of the Australian Universities. Professor Adams' reputation as an educational authority is world wide, and most students of education are familiar with his books. Many of our Australian and New Zealand returned soldiers have pleasant memories of their intercourse with him in London, and of the benefits they derived from his instruction.

Professor William Mitchell, of Adelaide, has been invited by the authorities of the University of Aberdeen to deliver the next course of Gifford Lectures on Religion.

The Chair of Philosophy at the University of Queensland having become vacant through the resignation of Professor Elton Mayo, Dr. M. Scott Fletcher, late Master of Wesley College, University of Sydney, has been appointed Acting-Professor of Philosophy for 1923. He will be assisted by Miss Flinn and Mr. W. M. Kyle. Dr. Scott Fletcher is a graduate of Sydney and Oxford Universities.

Mr. A. C. Fox, Lecturer on Philosophy at the University of Western Australia, has, since his appointment, been in sole charge of the studies within the Department of Philosophy. He will now receive some assistance from M. A. Laidlaw, B.A., who will be expected to lecture on both Classics and Philosophy. The Lecturers in new Universities are, as a rule, overworked and underpaid. Mr. Laidlaw graduated at Trinity College, Dublin, with a Double Senior Moderatorship, and was a Gold Medallist in both Philosophy and Classics. He held commissioned rank during the war, and was mentioned in despatches.

The Tutorial Class system, organised by the University of Sydney in connection with the Workers' Educational Association, was instituted in New South Wales in 1915. Since that date, economics and history have been the main subjects in which instruction has been given, but philosophy has not been neglected. Each class studies a subject for three consecutive years. There have been three of such classes in Sociology, three in Political Science (one being a four year session class), one in Logic and Philosophy, and thirteen classes in Psychology.

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(To May 19, 1923.)

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